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PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF THE ELITE
"NON-AGENCY"*
KIMBERLY

N. BROWN"

This Article examines the constitutionality of legislation creating a
new form of independent agency-in effect, a "non-agency" agency
residing in the no-man's-land between Articles I and I of the
Constitution. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress established the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB" or
"Board") and endowed it with massive governmental powers while
insulating it from traditional mechanisms for ensuring
accountability. Congress deemed the PCAOB not an agency,
rendered it substantially immune from judicial review, empowered
Board members to set their own salaries and budget, and gave the
embattled Securities and Exchange Commission-not the
President-thepower to appoint and remove Board members. In
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,
the statute was challenged as violating the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution and principles of separation of powers. The D.C.
Circuit upheld the statute, with the dissenting judge calling it "the
most important separation-of-powerscase regardingthe President's
appointment and removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20
years." The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. This Article
considers the legal and normative implications of the PCAOB
blueprint for future independent agencies, and explores the
underlying constitutional tension between Congress's power to
restrict and channel agency administration and the President's
power to control it. It suggests that the prevailing analytic
framework for evaluating challenges to novel agency forms is
problematic, as it reflects a myopic emphasis on presidentialpower
per se. This Article posits that a more justiciable "checks-andbalances" standard may be fashioned by considering whether
sufficient checks operate to cabin a suspect independent agency's
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actions without delving into thorny questions about the proper
scope and definition of executive power.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................
72
1.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE INDEPENDENT
AGENCY AND THE PCAOB .....................................
77

A. The TraditionalIndependent Agency Model ................... 78
B. The PCAOB: A Blueprintfor the "Non-Agency"
Agency Within an Independent Agency ..........................
81
C. Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB ..............................
85
1. Appointment and Removal ................................
86
2. Separation of Powers ....................................
87
II.

ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN INDEPENDENT
AGENCY WITHIN AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY: AD Hoc

STANDARDS AND EXECUTIVE POWER PER SE ...................... 89
A. The ConstitutionalText .....................................
90
B. The Leading Approach and Its Limits ............................. 93
1. M orrison v. O lson .......................................
94
........ . . 98
2. What Are "Core Executive Functions"? .........
3. Does Limited Removal Power Interfere with a
"Core Function"? Practicality and Efficiency
C oncerns .............................................
105
C. The Promising-butIncomplete-Presidential
A ccountability Concept.....................................
112

III.

TOWARD A REVISED FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOVEL INDEPENDENT AGENCY
STR U CTU R ES ..........................................................
116

A.

A Checks-and-BalancesApproach to Appointment and
R em oval ................................................
117
B. Structural Constraintsand the PCAOB ..........................
123
1. Checks on A gencies .....................................
123
2. Checks on the PCA OB ...................................
127
3. Another Look at the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ...................
130
C O N CLU SIO N .........................................................
135
INTRODUCTION

Although the framers of the Constitution consciously established
a national government comprised of separated powers, the modern
administrative state is dotted with numerous "independent" agencies,
which have been aptly characterized as "strange amalgam[s] of
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, combining functions of all
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three branches yet the creature[s] of none."1 There is a long list of
them. It includes such powerful regulators as the Federal Reserve
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the National Labor Relations
Board. The constitutionality of independent agencies has been well
established since 1935, when the Supreme Court decided, in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,2 that Congress can place
limitations on the President's authority to remove independent
agency appointees. A primary justification for the nearly ubiquitous
tolerance of independent agencies 4 is that the power to appoint
members remains the President's, and that power implicates a
corollary, though limited, power to remove. But in modern times,
Congress has not been content with confining its hybrid creations to
the structural contours previously blessed by the Supreme Court.6 As
a consequence, it has pushed the mechanisms for ensuring the
accountability of such public entities close to the constitutional
breaking point.7
The case in point is the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (the "PCAOB" or "Board"), which Congress created in the
aftermath of numerous accounting scandals following the implosion
of Enron and WorldCom.8 Congress endowed the PCAOB with
significant governmental authority to carry out its raison d'etre:
auditing the auditors of public companies subject to federal securities
laws. The Board promulgates rules; inspects and investigates firms for
violations of federal securities laws; and imposes censures,
suspensions, and monetary fines.9 The Board has subpoena authority,
official immunity from liability, and privileges from third party
discovery.'" But to Congress, it is not a federal agency."
1. Geoffrey P. Miller, IndependentAgencies, 1986 SuP. Cr. REV. 41,41.
2. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
3. Id. at 625-26, 632.
4. See Peter L. Strauss, Formaland Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 490 (1987).
5. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 102 (5th ed.

SHAPIRO

&

PAUL

R.

VERKUIL,

2009).

6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with ConstitutionalLaw: The PCAOB and
Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 977-78 (2005) (discussing 15

U.S.C. §§ 7211-7219 (2000)); see also infra Part I.B (same).
8. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101,116 Stat. 745, 750-53
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006)) (establishing the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board ("PCAOB")); see also infra Part I.B (discussing the PCAOB).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(c), 7215 (2006); see also infra Part I.B. (discussing the
establishment and powers of the PCAOB).
10. § 7215.
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The statute creating the PCAOB takes extraordinary steps
toward insulating it from traditional means of accountability, and in
doing so, puts great pressure on separation-of-powers norms. Most
significantly, it places the power to appoint and remove Board
members in the hands of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC")-itself an independent agency-and not the President.12 The
Board sets its own budget 3 and is exempt from the procedural and
judicial review strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 4 In what the dissenting judge called "the most important
separation-of-powers case regarding the President's appointment and
removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years,"15 the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the statute establishing the PCAOB, and the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 6
The PCAOB has ignited constitutional controversy because it
represents a new template for agencies that are not really agencies in
the traditional sense. The Board is, to coin a phrase, a "non-agency"
agency residing in the no-man's-land between Article I and Article II
of the Constitution.
Although Congress will, no doubt, continue to mint new public
entities with structural independence as it works to address twentyfirst century problems, the political appetite for novel forms of
"independent" regulators may well change. The ongoing recession
and the regulatory failures leading up to gargantuan economic
declines have prompted cries for agency reform. 7 The very entity
11. § 7211 ("The Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States

Government ....
").
12. 15

U.S.C.

§§ 7211(e)(1)-(5),

7217 (2006)

("The

[Securities and

Exchange

Commission ("SEC")] shall have oversight and enforcement authority over the Board
13. § 7211(c)(7).
14. § 7211(b) (declaring PCAOB "not ...an agency"); 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006)

(applying the Administrative Procedure Act to any "agency").
15. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378
(2009).

16. Id. As Peter Strauss observes, the Supreme Court may well dodge the
constitutional questions and resolve the case on other grounds. Peter L. Strauss, Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 62 VAND L. REV. EN
BANC 51, 58 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442879 (suggesting that questions of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, finality, or statutory construction might render the

constitutional questions unripe).
17. See generally Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-StructuredFinance and
Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53 (2009) (discussing

causes of the financial crisis and the need for regulatory reform).
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responsible for overseeing the PCAOB-the SEC-is charged with
inexplicably failing to protect investors from staggering financial
losses caused by a Ponzi scheme of historic proportions.18 The White
House recently proposed the establishment of a new agency to
protect the public from harmful financial products. 9 The
constitutionality of novel "non-agency" agencies with dubious lines of
accountability thus looms large.
This Article considers some of the legal and normative
implications of the PCAOB blueprint. Such implications are legion.20
Who is accountable if the Board abuses its power? If the President
has no power to appoint or remove members, does the Board's
exercise of authority violate the Appointments Clause or the
separation of powers more generally? To what extent is an entity like
the PCAOB accountable for its actions through judicial review? Is it
possible to challenge the PCAOB without disturbing the viability of
any independent agency that departs from a Cabinet-level structure
characterized by unfettered presidential removal power? This Article
explores, in particular, the underlying constitutional tension between
Congress's power to restrict and channel agency administration and
the President's power to control it.
Courts are currently ill-equipped to address these questions.
Prevailing Supreme Court precedent leaves them without a single
guiding principle or analytic framework for resolving questions
18. See Steven Pearlstein, SEC's Gaping Blind Spots Kept Madoff's Misdeeds out of
Sight, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, at A14 (describing the impending inspector general

report as likely to be a "devastating rebuke" of the SEC's "Madoff screwup"); Aaron
Pressman, Madoff Whistleblower Markopolos Blasts SEC, BUS. WK. ONLINE, June 8,
2009,
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/un2009/pi2009065_888396.htm

(describing a push for dramatic changes at the SEC after the $65 billion dollar Madoff
Ponzi scheme was uncovered as the "biggest fraud in U.S. investing history"); see also U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER

BERNARD

MADOFF'S

PONZI

SCHEME

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf
uncovering the Madoff scheme).

(2009),

(detailing

the

available

SEC's

failures

at

in

19. David Cho & Michael D. Shear, Obama Presents Bill to Create Consumer-Finance
Watchdog: New Agency's Scope Draws Stiff Industry Resistance, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009,

at A14 (discussing President Obama's proposal for establishment of the Consumer
Financial

Protection

Agency); Posting of Kimberly Palmer

to Alpha

Consumer,

http://www.usnews.comfblogs/alpha-consumer/2009/06/17/the-debate-over-obamas-newconsumer-agency-.html (June 17, 2009) (same).
20. See, e.g., Michael A. Carvin et al., Practitioner Note, Massive, Unchecked Power
by Design: The Unconstitutional Exercise of Executive Authority by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board,4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 199, 200 (2007) (arguing that Congress
violated fundamental constitutional principles in creating the PCAOB); Nagy, supra note

7, at 1031-32 (exploring whether the PCAOB is a state actor governed by the
Constitution).
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surrounding the propriety of limits on the President's power to
appoint and remove independent agency officials.2 In effect, the sky
is virtually the limit when it comes to new legislative configurations
for independent agencies. So long as Congress does not retain any
appointment or removal power for itself, it is largely free to insulate
agencies from effective presidential oversight if the officers of such
22
agencies are structurally subordinate to someone else.
This Article proceeds from the premise that some constraints on
Congress's ability to create new forms of independent agencies are
appropriate. If Congress and the Supreme Court are to continue
down the path of creating and endorsing structural novelties with
substantial governmental powers, they should first have in mind some
notion of where the outermost constitutional boundary for such
entities

lies.23

The

prevailing

standard

for

evaluating

the

constitutionality of infringements on the President's appointment and
removal powers-the so-called "core functions" test 24-is of limited
utility when it comes to novel entities like the PCAOB. This is partly
because, in crafting the test for this purpose in Morrison v. Olson,25
the Supreme Court failed to grapple with a key underlying question:
the meaning of executive power per se. Yet the scope of such
power-in particular, whether it encompasses the ability to dictate
the day-to-day exercise of agency officials' discretion-is hotly
debated.26
This Article posits that it is possible to fashion a justiciable
standard for review of the constitutionality of novel agency structures
without arriving at a requisite definition of "executive power."
Encroachments on the President's removal power may be analyzed
by considering the balance of power between the three branches
rather than by looking at presidential power in isolation. If Congress
delegates lawmaking and enforcement authority to an agency, it
should include some minimally sufficient accountability controls if
legislation is to survive checks-and-balances scrutiny. Such a "checksand-balances" analysis would enable courts to move beyond the
stagnancy of Morrison without undermining the central viability of
the independent agency model.
21. See infra Part II (discussing the problems with the prevailing "core functions" test,
such as the questions surrounding the foundational definition of executive power).
22. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
23. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 491.
24. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687-89 (1988).
25. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
26. See infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text (discussing the debate).
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Part I reviews the legal framework justifying the existence of
independent agencies. It then briefly summarizes the competing D.C.
Circuit opinions,27 which analyze the propriety of the latest blueprint
for the independent agency: the PCAOB.
Part II discusses the fundamental dilemma that remains after
Morrison: how does one know when Congress has gone too far in
constraining the President's power to appoint and remove officers of
independent agencies?28 It analyzes the prevailing approaches to the
problem and identifies a critical fault line: a singular focus on the
undefined concept of executive power per se. Because this emphasis
begs a virtually unanswerable question, a fresh perspective is
warranted.
Part III introduces an alternative approach to the question of
independent agencies' constitutionality. Rather than consider
presidential prerogative as an ideal to uphold for its own sake, this
Part outlines2 9 an analytical method that would focus on the overall
balance of power between the three branches, asking whether
sufficient checks exist to prevent tyranny by a given entity exercising
federal power under prevailing conditions. This Article concludes,
foremost, that Congress should provide mechanisms for ensuring fair
process, public disclosure, and judicial review in legislation
establishing novel structures for independent agencies.
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE INDEPENDENT AGENCY
AND THE

PCAOB

The administrative bureaucracy has long been criticized as a
"headless 'fourth branch' of the government," lacking in coordination
and control.3" Although the Constitution provides that there will be

27. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir.
2008), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted,129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
28. Cf. Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive
Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 463 (1987) ("[Agency] 'independence'
fosters the kind of supposedly creative tug-and-pull between Congress and the President
that underlies the concept of checks and balances.").
29. The precise contours of this approach will be explored further in a subsequent
piece by the author.
30. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 85 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN.
MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
WITH STUDIES OF
MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 40 (1937)). Some

ADMINISTRATIVE

commentators have
gone much further with their criticism. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (declaring the post-New Deal
administrative state "unconstitutional").
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executive "Departments,"31 it does not itself establish federal

agencies. All institutions of the United States government-other
than the President, the Vice President, the Supreme Court, and
Congress-are created by Congress under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, including the multitudinous bureaucracies of unelected agents
subordinate to the President.32 As a consequence, no single structure
or definition exists for so-called "federal agencies."
Nonetheless, a major distinction can be drawn between singleheaded or Cabinet-level agencies on the one hand and multi-member
or independent entities on the other. 33 Although legislatively
denominated a "non-agency, 3 4 the PCAOB is structured like an
independent agency,35 with one critical difference: the President lacks
the power to appoint or remove its members.3 6 This Part reviews the

traditional characteristics of the independent agency and how the
PCAOB defies them. It then summarizes the dueling D.C. Circuit
opinions on the constitutionality of the statute creating the Board
which, as Part II discusses, reflect inherent shortcomings with
prevailing law.
A.

The TraditionalIndependent Agency Model

Having first emerged in the late nineteenth century,37
independent agencies exercise a "full range" of regulatory and
adjudicatory authority. 38 Because of their "novelty in terms of
anything imagined by the framers," independent agencies present a
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also id. art. I, § 9 (identifying a "Treasury" of the
United States).
32. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 2007); see also
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 107-08 (1994) (noting that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides the
constitutional authority for independent agencies but suggesting that a strong showing of
necessity is required); cf. Lawson, supra note 30, at 1235 (arguing that the word "proper"
requires that Congress enact laws that are "consistent with background principles of
separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights").
33. See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice:The Theory
and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1236-94 (2000)
(listing and describing existing independent agencies).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2006).
35. But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 680
n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (refuting the contention that PCAOB is an independent agency upon
finding that it is comprised of inferior officers), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 2378 (2009).
36. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
37. Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1117.
38. Id. at 1112 ("[Independent agencies] can issue regulations, take administrative
action to enforce their statutes and regulations, and decide cases through administrative
adjudication.").
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challenge to the constitutional plan of government.39 In the words of
Geoffrey Miller, "[t]here is little rhyme or reason" to Congress's
choices with respect to their creation.' Both the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") (an independent agency) and the Department
of Justice ("DOJ") (a Cabinet-level agency), for example, enforce the
federal antitrust laws."
The key element that differentiates independent agencies from
Cabinet-level departments is insulation from presidential control.4"
Although the President appoints most members of independent
agencies, he can generally only remove them "for cause" under
express or implied statutory limitations. 43 By contrast, Cabinet-level
heads of executive departments mentioned in the Constitution can be
removed at will by the President.'
The President's appointment power is also attenuated for
independent agencies. Commission or board members generally serve
for fixed, staggered terms extending beyond a given President's term,
rendering a new administration incapable of replacing them upon
taking office. 5 Additionally, independent agencies are exempt from a
number of burdensome statutes and executive orders that add

39. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 131 (3d ed. 2000).
40. Miller, supra note 1, at 73.
41. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46 (2006) ("The [Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")]
is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations ...
from using unfair methods of competition ....), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25 (2006) ("[I]it shall
be the duty of the several United States attorneys ... to institute proceedings in equity to
prevent and restrain [violations of the federal antitrust laws]."). Peter Strauss has
suggested that this happenstance is indicative of "the circumstances of the particular
regulatory regime, the temper of presidential/congressional relations at the time, or the
perceived success or failure of an existing agency performing like functions, more than any
grand scheme of government." Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separationof Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 585 (1984). Despite
the apparent arbitrariness underlying the establishment of many independent agencies,
even "the executive branch has not consistently opposed [them] on constitutional
grounds." Miller, supra note 1, at 84.
42. Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1136; see also Miller, supra note 1, at 51 (listing
seven characteristics that independent agencies "[ailmost uniformly.., display").
43. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626-32 (1935) (holding
that Congress can impose "for cause" conditions on the President's removal of quasilegislative or quasi-judicial officers).
44. See John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential Succession and
Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 1004 (2004) (noting that Cabinet
members may be fired at will).
45. In recent years, Congress has also created single-headed independent agencies
(such as the Social Security Administration) with administrators who serve fixed terms
and has placed limits on the President's ability to remove them. Breger & Edles, supra
note 33, at 1207-08.

80
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procedural requirements and protections for members of the public46
beyond those contained in the APA's notice-and-comment
rulemaking provisions.47

The emergence of the independent form of agency reflected a
belief that structuring government in a way that removes it from
presidential influence and politics is a good thing.48 The theory is that

agency independence facilitates logical decision making grounded in
objective data and science." Accordingly, independent agencies are
generally comprised of an odd number of individuals from competing
political parties so that no more than a bare majority can dominate
the political agenda." Although most modern enabling statutes do
not dictate special qualifications or experience for members of
independent agencies, others require empirical experts in particular
51
areas of regulation to foster neutrality.
A prominent example of the traditional model of the
independent agency is the SEC, which administers the federal
securities laws and regulates firms and individuals engaged in the
purchase or sale of securities.52 Its five members serve staggered five-

year terms and are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, with no more than three members coming from
46. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 107 & n.438 (noting that independent
agencies are expressly exempted from Executive Orders that require agencies to
undertake cost-benefit analyses in connection with regulations).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
48. See Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1132 (explaining that the FTC emerged
from the belief that apolitical experts-versus a single person-were required for an
antitrust commission to develop a body of administrative law).
49. See id. at 1130-31 (discussing the influence of the Progressive movement on
Congress's establishment of independent agencies). Scholars dispute the expertise and
apolitical rationales for independent agencies. See Miller, supra note 1, at 80 ("There is no
evidence that the level of expertise in independent agencies is any higher than it is in
executive branch agencies."); id. at 83 ("In agencies serving the interests of particular
industries, it is all too possible for them to pass over the line of objectivity and become the
advocates of their industries."); see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 96 (discussing
capture theory-which posits that regulatory agencies act in the interests of the dominant
industries they are charged with regulating versus in the interests of the public-in relation
to independent agencies); id. at 102 (suggesting that politics is at the core of so-called
independent agencies).
50. Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1137.
51. Id. at 1131. An example is the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, whose
members must be experts in nuclear safety. Id. at 1140 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2286(b)(1)
(1994)). The Federal Reserve Board must be selected "with due regard to a fair
representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial interests, and
geographical divisions of the country." Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1994)).
52. See id. at 1285-86 (discussing the Securities and Exchange Commission (citing 15
U.S.C. § 78d to 78d-2 (1994))); see also id. at 1236-94 (listing and describing existing
independent agencies).
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the same political party.53 There is no statutory provision for their
removal by the President, 4 although lower courts have accepted the
idea "that the President may remove a commissioner only for
'inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.' "I' Despite its
conventional structure, the SEC plays a critical role in distinguishing
the PCAOB from the traditional independent agency because it-and
not the President-appoints the Board's members.
B.

The PCA OB: A Blueprintfor the "Non-Agency" Agency Within
an Independent Agency

The PCAOB is, indeed, a structural anomaly. During oral
argument before the D.C. Circuit in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Co. Accounting Oversight Board,56 in which the constitutionality of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Act") creating the PCAOB was
challenged, the court observed that if the Act "were upheld, it would
be a green light for all sorts of new creations, independent agencies
within independent agencies."5 7 Having unavailingly pressed for a
historical example of a similarly structured entity, the court offered
an answer from the bench: "Zero. Zero. In our history."5 8
Independent agencies were historically devised " '[w]ithout too
much political theory,' "" and the PCAOB is no exception. It was
created in reaction to swelling criticism of the self-regulatory system
that characterized the accounting profession prior to the scandals of
Enron and WorldCom. 6 Although the federal securities laws
empower the SEC to regulate accounting methods for the
preparation and auditing of financial statements, the SEC historically
deferred to the accounting industry's principal trade association to set

53. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
54. See Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1285.
55. SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988); accord MFS
Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380 F.3d 611, 619 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he power to remove
Commissioners belongs to the President, and even that is 'commonly understood' to be
limited to removal for 'inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.' ")
56. 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378
(2009).
57. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d 667 (No. 07-5127)
(Judge Kavanaugh speaking).
58. Id. at 38.
59. Miller, supra note 1, at 43 (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 2 (1938)).
60. See Stephen Labaton, A Push to Fix the Fix on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2006, at C4 (describing events leading up to creation of the PCAOB).
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auditing standards.6 1 When the Enron debacle exploded at the end of
2001, Congress revamped this failed system of self-regulation.62 After
consideration of more than thirty bills, the Act was passed, and
President George W. Bush signed it into law,63 substituting the
PCAOB as the primary force behind auditing standards for the
accounting industry.'M
The Board is a creature of Congress, but it does not reside
squarely within the executive or legislative branches. Congress
established the PCAOB as "a body corporate, [to] operate as a
nonprofit corporation"' 65
-"not... an agency or establishment of the
United States Government" 6 6 -and deemed "[n]o member or person
employed by, or agent for, the Board ...to be an officer or employee
of or agent for the Federal Government."6 7
Despite its legislative and self-described "private sector,
nonprofit" persona,6" the PCAOB operates as an arm of the federal
government69 with a distinctly public mission: "to oversee the audit of
public companies that are subject to the securities laws.., in order to
protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the
preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit
61. Nagy, supra note 7, at 984-86. The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA") sets standards for so-called "generally accepted accounting
principles" ("GAAP") and "generally accepted auditing standards" ("GAAS");
responsibility for the former was later absorbed by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board ("FASB"). Id.
62. Id. at 996.
63. Id. For an engaging discussion of the various proposals for structuring the entity
that ultimately became the PCAOB, including competing views of appropriate executive
oversight, see id. at 996-1006.
64. See id. at 992 (citing Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Yawn:
Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 919
(2003) (recognizing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act took away the AICPA's decision-making
power); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 103(a)(3)(A)(ii), 116 Stat. 745,
747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2006))).
65. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006)).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a)-(b) (2006) ("[The Board] shall be subject to, and have all the
powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by the District of Columbia Nonprofit
Corporation Act.").
67. § 7211(b).
68. See
Public Company
Accounting
Oversight
Board
Home
Page,
http://www.pcaobus.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
69. In the Free Enterprise Fund litigation, the PCAOB itself conceded that Board
members are federal officers. See Brief of Appellees at 19, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5127) ("Board members
are unquestionably inferior officers [under the Constitution], and Congress properly
lodged authority to appoint them in the Commissioner of the SEC-the head of the
department that comprehensively oversees the Board's work."), reh'g en banc denied, cert.
granted,129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
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reports."7 It is entrusted with five primary responsibilities:7 1 (1)
registrationof all domestic and foreign public accounting firms;7 2 (2)
promulgation of rules establishing the auditing, quality control, and
ethics standards for preparation of audit reports;7 3 (3) periodic
inspections of registered accounting firms to evaluate compliance with
securities laws;74 (4) investigationsof registered firms for violations of
such laws;75 and (5) imposition of disciplinary sanctions, with a
maximum penalty of $750,000 for individuals and $15 million for
firms.7 6

70. § 7211(a).
71. See Nagy, supra note 7, at 1007 (listing the PCAOB's principal responsibilities as
set out in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
72. § 7211(c)(1).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(1)-(8) (2006) (amending
the Exchange Act, Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a78111 (2006)), to empower the Board to bar registered firms from performing non-audit
services along with the audit of a public company); 15 U.S.C. § 7231 (2006) (empowering
the Board to exempt firms from the prohibition of services under the Exchange Act). See
generally Nagy, supra note 7, at 1011-12 (discussing PCAOB's duty to promulgate rules
establishing standards for audit reports).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 7214(a) (2006).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(1) (2006). Applications for registration with the PCAOB must
include "consent executed by the public accounting firm to cooperation in and compliance
with any request for testimony or the production of documents made by the Board." 15
U.S.C. § 7212(b)(3)(A) (2006).
76. § 7215(c)(4). As a congressional experiment on delegating authority outside the
boundaries of the executive branch, the PCAOB shares common ground with other
entities operating on the fringe of presidential control. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 53
(noting similarities between the PCAOB and other "mixed-character 'government
entities' "). So-called self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") have long played a major
role in oversight of the U.S. securities industry. For example, the regulatory, enforcement,
and adjudicatory arms of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") recently merged their operations to become
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), which bills itself as "the largest
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States." See
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, About FINFRA, http://www.finra.org/About
FINRA/index.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). There are a number of structural factors that
distinguish SROs and government corporations from the independent agencies discussed
here. See Breger & Edles, supra note 33, at 1228-31 (describing public corporations in the
context of independent agencies); Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as
Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1246-50 (2007) (describing self-regulatory
stock exchanges and their public interest role); Nagy, supra note 7, at 1022-29 (comparing
PCAOB to SROs and government corporations). Similar accountability questions linger,
however. Moreover, a different legal framework-the state action doctrine-is implicated
in addressing those questions with respect to SROs and government corporations. See Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (providing that, under the traditional
state action doctrine, the analysis turns on whether a "sufficiently close nexus" exists
between the state and the challenged action to deem a private entity a state actor for
constitutional purposes). These issues are not discussed in any detail here.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

Because Congress created the PCAOB "for the furtherance of
governmental objectives,"7 7 there is little question that the Board is a
public entity subject to the strictures of the Constitution.78 In Lebron
v. National RailroadPassenger Corp.," the Supreme Court held that
Amtrak is a governmental unit for constitutional purposes despite a
similar statutory declaration that it was a corporation and " 'not ...
an agency or establishment of the United States Government.' "80 It
rejected the contention that Congress can relieve "what the
Constitution regards as the Government" by proclaiming an entity a
private corporation.81
Nonetheless, the PCAOB is different from Cabinet-level
executive agencies exercising powers of similar magnitude.
Department heads are accountable to the President-and thus to the
political process-through the powers of appointment and removal.82
The PCAOB is comprised of five members who are appointed by the
SEC. Board members serve staggered, five-year terms that are
renewable once. 3 Only the SEC may remove them, and only upon a
showing of "good cause."' For the President to exert any control
over the PCAOB through his constitutional appointment power, he
must satisfy what opponents of the Act call its "double for-cause"
provision;"5 that is, he must dismiss SEC members for cause for failing
to dismiss PCAOB members for cause.

77. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger, 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995). The statute creating

Amtrak-like the statute creating the PCAOB-declared that it is not an agency or
establishment of the U.S. Government. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, § 301, 84 Stat.
1327, 1330, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1379 (1994). Unlike the PCAOB,

however, Amtrak is federally funded and controlled by a board whose directors are largely
appointed by the President. See Nagy, supra note 7, at 1037-38 (discussing Lebron).
78. Indeed, the PCAOB defended the constitutional challenge on the merits in the
Free Enterprise Fund case without making the claim that it is immune from constitutional
scrutiny. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 69, at 19 ("[P]laintiffs' challenges fail on the

merits."); see also Nagy, supra note 7, at 981-82, 1036-40 (arguing that the PCAOB is a
public entity that is liable for constitutional violations under Lebron).
79. 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
80. Id. at 391 (quoting Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, § 301, 84 Stat. 1327, 1330,
repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1379 (1994)); see also Breger & Edles, supra

note 33, at 1231-38 (discussing the emergence and use of public corporations).
81. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400.
82. Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE

L.J. 427, 448 (noting that agencies are headed by a politically accountable individual
whose links to the President are sustained by the appointment and removal powers).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(1)-(5) (2006).

84. § 7211(e)(6).
85. Brief of Appellants at 6,Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5127), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S.Ct.
2378 (2009).
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The bulk of the responsibility for keeping the Board's actions in
check thus falls on the SEC, which also has broad (but not unlimited)
oversight authority over the PCAOB. As a result, a key question
regarding the legality of the Act's provisions creating the PCAOB is
whether diverting oversight responsibility almost exclusively to
another independent agency suffices under the Constitution. The
D.C. Circuit considered this question in Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,86 which is now pending
before the Supreme Court.
C.

Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB

In 2006, a public accounting firm that underwent a PCAOB audit
challenged the constitutionality of the Act that created Board,87
raising two principal arguments: (1) that the Act violates the
Constitution's Appointments Clause because the President has no
authority to appoint or remove Board members; and (2) that the
PCAOB's insulation from presidential control conflicts more
generically with separation-of-powers principles.8"
The district court entered summary judgment for the PCAOB, 9
and the D.C. Circuit affirmed two to one.9" The majority observed
that
[t]he crux of the [plaintiffs'] challenge-that the double
cause limitation on removal makes it impossible for
President to perform his duties-is a question of
impression as neither the Supreme Court nor this court

forthe
first
has

86. 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378
(2009).
87. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217, 2007 WL
891675, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007), affd, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rehg en banc
denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). For more information regarding the
accounting firm itself and the results of the inspection, see PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB RELEASE NO. 104-2005-082, INSPECTION OF BECKSTEAD &

WATTS, LLP 2-5 (2005), availableat http://www.pcaobus.org/Inspections/Public-Reports
/2005/Beckstead-and-Watts.pdf.
88. Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL 891675, at *4-5. On appeal, the Board characterized
the case as a facial challenge, and the majority and dissent sparred over whether this
characterization affected the analysis, with the dissenting judge suggesting that the
distinction was unimportant as "this is not the kind of case where a statute might be
applied constitutionally in some instances but not in others." Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at
704 n.12 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). But cf id. at 684 n.14 (majority opinion) ("[T]he fact
that this is a facial challenge significantly affects the analysis.").
89. Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL 891675, at *4-5.
90. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 669.
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considered a situation where a restriction on removal passes
through two levels of control.91
A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in May of 2009.92
1. Appointment and Removal
The D.C. Circuit found no violation of the Appointments
Clause.9 3 The Constitution provides that "[t]he President ... shall

nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States."94 "[B]ut," it

continues, "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."95 Thus, although the
President alone appoints "Officers," Congress can authorize courts or
department heads to appoint "inferior Officers."96 As a consequence,

if PCAOB members are "principal" officers, the SEC cannot appoint
them.97 If they are "inferior," the SEC can appoint them so long as it
constitutes a "Head of Department." 98 These constitutional terms are
not defined.
Applying the Supreme Court's reading of "inferior officer" in
Edmond v. United States,99 the D.C. Circuit majority held that the
Board is composed of officers inferior to the SEC.' ° Under Edmond,
"the term 'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with some higher
ranking officer or officers below the President."10 1 Because the SEC
"exercise[s] comprehensive control over Board procedures and
decisions and Board members,"'0 2 the court reasoned, its exclusive

91. Id. at 679.
92. Id.; Free EnterpriseFund, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
93. Free EnterpriseFund, 537 F.3d at 669.
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-33 (1976) (interpreting the Constitution's
reference to "inferior officers" to mean that Congress cannot appoint principal officers).
98. For the Free Enterprise Fund court's analysis of this issue, see infra notes 102-05
and accompanying text.
99. 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997).
100. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 672-76
(D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
101. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662.
102. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 672-76 (citing various provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act).
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authority to appoint and remove them is constitutional.'013 The dissent

retorted that Board members are principal-not inferior-officers., 4
In the dissent's view, they would be inferior only if the SEC could

remove them "for failure to follow substantive SEC direction" with
respect to Board inspections, investigations, and enforcement
actionsy1 that is, the exercise of quintessential indicia of executive
power. As discussed below,10 6 this debate over inferior status is at the
heart of the legal questions raised by the Free EnterpriseFund case.
2. Separation of Powers
As for the plaintiffs' alternative argument that the "double forcause" structure undermines the President's prerogative to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"' 7 the majority employed a
facile, "mountain-versus-molehill' 0" reading of Morrison v. Olson, °9

the seminal decision in which the Supreme Court rejected a challenge
to the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978.110 Although "the President does not directly select or

supervise the Board's members," the D.C. Circuit reasoned, he
possesses "significant influence over the Commission"-which in turn
exercises "comprehensive control over the Board""'-through his
power to appoint "[l]ike-minded [SEC] Commissioners" and remove

103. Id. at 680 ("The Board's status, as a heavily controlled component of an
independent agency, is fully congruent with the paradigm laid out in Humphrey's
Executor.").
104. Id. at 687 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
105. Id. The majority rejected the plaintiffs' contention that, even if Board members
are inferior officers, the Commission is not a "Department" and its five Commissioners
are not its "Head." Id. at 676 (majority opinion). The majority reasoned that, although the
Supreme Court did not resolve in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 886 (1991),
whether independent agencies are "Departments," it loosely described "Departments" as
"like the Cabinet-level departments." Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 667. The D.C. Circuit
found the SEC to be Cabinet-like. Id. Given that independent agencies are constitutional
under Humphrey's Executor, it added, the SEC must accordingly be allowed to exercise its
legislatively-authorized power to appoint inferior officers. Id. The majority concluded
that, although the SEC Chairman is not an agency "Head," the plaintiffs "pointed to no
authority wherein the Framers foreclosed Congress from granting multi-member
commissions authority to appoint inferior officers." Id. at 677-78. The dissent agreed that
"both text and longstanding Executive interpretation confirm that the head of a
department can consist of multiple persons." Id. at 712 n.24 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
106. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
108. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 681 n.11.
109. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
110. Id. at 660-61 (reviewing the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (Supp. V
1982)).
111. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 681.
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them for cause. 112 "[B]ecause the Board is subject to much greater
Executive control than the independent counsel," the court dismissed
what it called a " 'sky is falling' . .. response to a relatively
'
insignificant innovation." 113
The dissent responded that the essential levers of presidential
power include the ability to direct the actions of "alter egos" within
the executive branch."' Viewed in this light, the PCAOB is a far cry
from the independent agency model previously endorsed by the
Supreme Court. To be sure, members of traditional independent
agencies are removable for cause-but by the President. In Morrison,
the Attorney General retained the authority to remove the
independent counsel, and the President retained the authority to
remove the Attorney General at will. By contrast, the SEC is not a
presidential "alter ego" like the Attorney General, as Commissioners
can only be removed for cause.'1 5
Thus, the dissent added, the arrangement between the SEC, the
PCAOB, and the President is inconsistent with a "constitutional
structure [that is] premised.., on the notion that such unaccountable
power is inconsistent with individual liberty., 116 Congress constrained
the President's influence in the appointment and removal of PCAOB
members to ordering SEC Commissioners to remove Board members
for cause, and firing them if they refuse. "For cause" restrictions do
not enable the President to remove Commissioners for failing to take
the discretionary act of firing a Board member,'17 and even if they did,
removal of a Commissioner would not result in removal of a Board
member unless the President with Senate confirmation replaced a
majority of SEC Commissioners with individuals willing to fire sitting

112. Id. at 682.
113. Id. at 681 n.11. The independent counsel could be removed " 'only by the personal

action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical disability, mental
incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such
independent counsel's duties.' " Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)

(Supp. V 1982)). The Attorney General was required to submit a report to both the
Special Division (a special court created by the Act to appoint independent counsels) and

the Judiciary Committee of the Senate and House. Id. at 663-64 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 596(a)(2) (Supp. V 1982)). The Special Division could terminate the office of the

independent counsel at any time upon a finding that its investigation was "substantially
completed." Id. at 664 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (Supp. V. 1982)). The statute also

provided for congressional oversight of the independent counsel's activities. Id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 595(a)(1) (Supp. V 1982)).
114. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 686 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
115. Id.

116. Id. at 688.
117. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 85, at 19.
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PCAOB members.118 Satisfied that the "double for-cause" provision
readily survived Morrison, however, the D.C. Circuit majority did not
engage the dissent on the normative question of whether the Act
enabled "unaccountable power" in conflict with broader separation of
powers principles.119
II. ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY
WITHIN AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY: AD HOC STANDARDS AND
EXECUTIVE POWER PER SE

Although unsatisfying, the D.C. Circuit majority's decision seems
technically correct. As this Part explains, Morrison on its face leaves
Congress tremendous leeway to configure independent agencies in a
manner that severs them from traditional mechanisms of
accountability. After looking first to the text of the Constitution for
guidance, this Part critiques the "incompletely defined"'2 ° modes of
prevailing analysis of the constitutionality of legislation constraining
presidential appointment and removal power and identifies two key
problems. First, the crown jewel of Morrison-its so-called "core
functions" inquiry-is effectively trumped by its preliminary analysis
of the term "inferior officer." Because the Court has defined
inferiority by virtue of an officer's structurally subordinate positionrather than by the scope of his authority-there is little chance that
the President's power will be considered compromised if he cannot
directly terminate an inferior officer for any reason. As a result,
Congress is free to render agencies unaccountable to the public
through a democratically-elected branch of government. The second
is a fundamental bootstrapping problem: the failure to resolve
requisite questions regarding the scope of core executive power over
agencies. 121 Because the Court has failed to define the foundational
concept of presidential core functions, Morrison provides a shaky
foundation on which to scrutinize the constitutionality of legislation
establishing new agencies. This Part concludes that something akin to
a "presidential accountability" approach has greater potential for
systematically distinguishing between problematic agency structures
118. See id. at 21-22.
119. Free Enter. Fund,537 F.3d at 688 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
120. JERRY
L. MASHAW,
RICHARD A.
MERRILL
&
PETER M. SHANE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 225 (5th ed. 2003).

121. See generally Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's

Separation of Powers, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1079, 1095 (2004) (" 'Core function' as
currently constituted poses deep and perhaps insurmountable problems because as a
theoretical matter, it is impossible to distinguish clearly between the supposedly 'separate
and distinct' powers of government.").
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and tolerable ones, but suggests that it too ultimately falls short
because of its narrow focus on executive power per se.
A.

The Constitutional Text

Although scholars dispute the propriety of functionalism as a
mode of constitutional analysis,' 22 it is largely beyond debate that
constitutional text is a proper starting point for evaluating the
legitimacy of novel entities like the PCAOB. 12 3 Few clues appear in
the Constitution as to what the framers intended the executive
apparatus to look like beyond the President and the Vice President. It
is clear that they envisioned the creation of executive departments,
each headed by a "principal Officer" appointed exclusively by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.'24 The
constitutional text enables the President to "require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
'
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices."125
It thus suggests that the framers conceived of subordinate executive
officials with policymaking roles.' 26 The only enterprise that the
Constitution expressly links to such officials is the "executive
Department," for which there will be a principal officer-"the
28
principal Officer" 27-whom only the President can appoint.
122. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1522-29 (1991); Strauss, supra note 4, at 489-92; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism
After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 493-96 (1987). But cf Sargentich, supra note
28, at 458 (noting that critiques of formalism exist and that those critiques focus on the
idea that the law is in reality very similar to morals and politics in many respects).
123. See Miller, supra note 1, at 57 (advocating a "neoclassical" approach to analyzing
the constitutionality of independent agencies and noting that such an analysis should start
from the constitutional text, interpreted "in light of the tripartite structure established by
the Framers"). But see William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
983, 998-1000 (2009) (arguing that textualists wrongly assume that text was central to
meaning at the time of the founding).
124. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
125. Id. Professors Lessig and Sunstein suggest that, without the Opinions Clause, it is
not evident that the President would have had the power to direct the departments to
report to him as a matter of constitutional necessity. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at
34. The Opinions Clause thus prevents Congress from creating agencies completely
severed from presidential control. See id. Peter Strauss has identified another potential
constitutional problem with the PCAOB that is grounded in the Opinions Clause, viz.,
whether Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has "discovered a way impermissibly to
delegate important executive 'duties' to officials who are beyond the President's effective
ability to command an 'Opinion, in writing' on the matter in which those duties will be
exercised." Strauss, supra note 16, at 59.
126. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 86-87.
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (emphasis added).
128. Because the Constitution separately refers to "Heads" of "Departments," there is
a counterargument that if "the principal officer" and department heads were one and the
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Thus, the framers may have envisioned an executive branch
composed of numerous departments with single heads below the

President who, in turn, may be authorized by Congress to appoint
"inferior" officers.1 29 They could have drafted the text to leave room

for the creation of agencies headed by boards or commissions
comprised of multiple individuals-by stating, for example, that the
President may require the written opinion of "principal Officers in
executive Departments," or of "any principal Officer." The precise
use of the word "the" suggests that multiple "principal Officers" may
not have been within the constitutional purview for an executive
department. Yet even the dissenting D.C. Circuit judge in Free
Enterprise Fund accepted without hesitation that multi-headed

independent agencies comport with the constitutional "executive
130
Department" concept.

The Supreme Court has not relied on the Opinions Clause to

assess the constitutionality of entities operating "independent" of the
President; it has looked instead through the lens of the Appointments

Clause.'

The Constitution is quite explicit with respect to the

President's appointment power, 32 but it says nothing about his
authority to remove officers. Article II, Section 4 provides for
congressional removal of officers only by impeachment. 33 A reader
"could reasonably believe: that impeachment is the only permissible
form of removal ...[or] that Congress's power to create offices
' 34
carries with it the power to prescribe the form of removal.'
Alternatively, removal by the President could be contingent-like
same, there is little reason-other than inadvertence-for the framers to have made the
distinction. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 34-35 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
The framers' separate reference to "executive Departments" in the Opinions Clause also
raises the question of whether some other type of department could exist. Id. at 35.
129. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
130. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 688 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,dissenting), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2378
(2009).
131. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1988) (assessing the
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute under the Appointments Clause).
132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.").
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("[A]ll Civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
134. Lawson, supra note 30, at 1244 n.74.
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appointment-on the advice and consent of the Senate.'35 Alexander

Hamilton stated, regarding the Senate's role, that "the consent of that
body would be necessary to displace as well as appoint."'3 6
Although Congress historically embraced Hamilton's view of the
removal process,'3 7 the Supreme Court ultimately did not.'38 Initially,
in Myers v. United States,3 9 it understood the President's power to

remove officers to be incident to the appointment power and
"exclusive" to the President.'" The Court narrowed the scope of
Myers in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,'41 however, and
upheld legislative restrictions on the President's removal powers.'42

Rather than hewing closely to constitutional text, the Court based its
decision on pragmatic concerns that the "coercive influence" of
presidential removal power threatened agencies' ability to act with
independence. 43 It concluded that, so long as the agency in question

exercised "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" as well as executive
functions, Congress could forbid the President from removing
officials except "for cause."'" Humphrey's Executor is considered the

seminal case that legitimated independent agencies as a constitutional
matter.'45 As Peter Strauss has observed, the Supreme Court has
signaled a reluctance to disturb the well-entrenched legality of

independent agencies since Humphrey's Executor and "[mlost of the
literature thriving under the influence of these cases has assumed
such an outcome, indeed struggled for a means of justifying it."' 46

135. PIERCE ETAL., supra note 5, at 103.
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
137. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 103.
138. See infra Part II.B.2.
139. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
140. Id. at 106.
141. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
142. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 104 & n.70.
143. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 630.
144. Id. at 629, 631-32; see also Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958)
(preventing President Eisenhower from removing, without cause, a member of the War
Crimes Commission with quasi-judicial duties). Humphrey's Executor has been called
"one of the more egregious opinions to be found on pages of the United States Supreme
Court Reports." Miller, supra note 1, at 93 (citations omitted). Taken to its logical
extreme, the Humphrey's approach enables Congress to render even Cabinet-level
officials removable for cause simply by including in their job descriptions quasi-judicial or
quasi-legislative functions. But cf id. at 66 (suggesting that such functions can be
considered "purely executive in nature" as agencies are simply executing legislative
mandates).
145. See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 120, at 225.
146. Strauss, supra note 4, at 490.
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The Leading Approach and Its Limits

The implication of Humphrey's Executor, that Congress may
tinker with the President's power to appoint and remove, has enabled
modern legislators to comfortably experiment with new forms of
independent agencies. Litigants seeking to challenge entities like the
PCAOB find themselves in a double bind: they must either confront
the very concept that limitations on the President's power to appoint
and remove officials are constitutional or find a principled way to
distinguish a new agency structure from the panoply of existing
independent agencies.'4 7 Because Morrison sets forth the most current
approach to evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that constrain
the President's ability to remove officers exercising executive power,
its capacity to accommodate evolving bureaucratic structures is
critical to ensuring that Congress does not stray too far from the
Constitution's tripartite system when it legislates the existence of new
agencies. But the standard applied in Morrison raises more questions
than it answers.148 At least two problems predominate. First, the
Court relied on the ambiguous distinction between "principal" and
"inferior" officer to effectively render Congress in complete control
of the scope of the President's constitutional power to appoint and
remove officers exercising executive power.149 So long as Congress
makes top officers structurally subordinate to someone else, the
President's appointment and removal power falls by the wayside
regardless of the scope of executive power afforded that officer.
Second, the Morrison Court overlooked the requisite definition of
147. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667,
685 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("The bulk of the [plaintiffs'] challenge to the Act was fought-and
lost-over seventy years ago when the Supreme Court decided Humphrey's Executor."),
reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
148. See Kevin M. Stack, The Story of Morrison v. Olson: The Independent Counsel and
Independent Agencies in Watergate's Wake, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 401, 442
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (noting that Morrison left

open numerous questions, including why Congress's power to create independent agencies
is best explained by impairment of executive functions, how core functions balancing
should be performed, and the theoretical justification for agency independence).
149. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) ("We need not attempt here to decide
exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers, because in our view

appellant clearly falls on the 'inferior officer' side of that line ... appellant is subject to
removal by a higher Executive Branch official."); see also infra notes 162-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the Morrison Court's analysis of whether the independent

counsel was a "principal" or "inferior" officer). The Supreme Court did not provide a
definitive test for inferior status in subsequent decisions addressing the issue, either. See
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) ("Our cases have not set forth an
exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for
Appointments Clause purposes."); see also infra notes 169-71 (discussing Edmond).
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"core executive functions" in holding that, whatever they may be, the
independent counsel statute did not compromise them. 5 ' Even if
there were such a definition, the Court provided no meaningful
standards for ascertaining when a statute impermissibly interfered
with such functions.'51 As a result, the prevailing law is feckless and
ill-suited for evaluating the constitutionality of novel entities like the
PCAOB.
1. Morrison v. Olson
Without overruling Humphrey's Executor, the Morrison Court

discarded the distinction between purely executive and quasilegislative or quasi-judicial functions in favor of an alternative
functional approach to analyzing infringements on the President's
authority to remove appointed officials.'52 To state the goal of
Morrison's "core functions" test is to define it: "to ensure that
Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of the
'executive power' and his constitutionally appointed duty 'to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed' under Article 1I. " 153 The
Court thus identified the locus of executive authority in two
provisions of Article II-the "Vesting Clause," which lodges
"executive power" in the President alone,'54 and the "Take Care
Clause," which provides that the President shall ensure faithful
execution of the laws.' It then established a constitutional standard
that tolerates infringements on the President's removal authority so
long as the core executive functions derived from Article 1I are not
unduly compromised.'56
In Morrison, the question before the Court was whether a
provision of the Ethics in Government Act limiting the President's
ability to remove the independent counsel impermissibly interfered
150. Morrison,487 U.S. at 689-93.
151. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 513 ("While 'core functions' may be the best that the
most sophisticated of analysts can suggest, it has no stable content.") (citations omitted).
Professors Lessig and Sunstein note that the composition of the President's core functions
depends heavily on the amount of presidential removal (hence supervisory) power that the
statutory words afford. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 110.
152. Morrison,487 U.S. at 689-90.
153. Id.
154. Cf Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 47-48 (arguing that the Vesting Clause
only refers to which branch of government has executive power, not what that power
consists of).
155. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
156. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 ("[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions
are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional
duty....").
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with the President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed
functions. 57 Under the statute, only the Attorney General could
remove the independent counsel and " 'only for good cause.' "158 In
holding that the "good cause" provision did not interfere with the

President's core executive functions,159 the Court left scant room for
finding novel independent agency structures unconstitutional.
Two features of the Morrison decision operate to protect

subsequent statutory schemes from serious constitutional scrutiny.
The first is the Court's hinging of the core functions query on a
potentially circular and over-inclusive cause-and-effect test: if an

officer is inferior, the analysis goes, the President's ability to fire at
will is not central to the exercise of his "executive power" under the
Vesting Clause16 ° or his executive functions under the Take Care
Clause. 6 ' In Morrison, the independent counsel was deemed inferior

largely because she was "subject to removal by a higher Executive
Branch official"-the Attorney General.162 Because the "inferior"
label fit, the Court found that the President's need to control the

exercise of the independent counsel's discretion was not "so central to
the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require ... that the

counsel be terminable at will by the President."163 The label, in other
157. Id. at 685. The Court relatedly asked whether, "taken as a whole, the Act violates
the separation of powers by reducing the President's ability to control the prosecutorial
powers wielded by the independent counsel." Id.
158. Id. at 663 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (Supp. V 1982)).
159. Id. at 691.
160. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
161. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692 (reasoning that, unlike the hypothetical case where
removal power over an executive official has been completely stripped from the President,
thereby removing any means to ensure "faithful execution" of the laws, the statute in
question gave him authority to ensure the independent counsel's competent performance
by virtue of the Attorney General's power to remove her for cause); see also id. at 695-96
(finding no separation of powers violation because the Attorney General retained the
authority to remove the independent counsel for cause).
162. Id. at 671. She also had "limited jurisdiction and tenure and lack[ed] policymaking
or significant administrative authority." Id. As discussed below, these factors do not serve
to meaningfully distinguish between principal officers and inferior ones. See infra notes
189-91 and accompanying text.
163. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691; see Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997).
There are few contemporaneous signals as to what the framers had in mind in drawing this
distinction between "Officer" and "inferior Officer," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, as "the
inferior appointment provision was added on the last day of the Convention with virtually
no discussion." United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing 2
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 627-28 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
University Press rev. ed. 1937) (1911)) ("There was little discussion of this [inferior
officer] component of the provision during the Constitutional Convention."). Nineteenthcentury jurisprudence suggested that the framers created the lesser classification because
they foresaw that, "when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary,"
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words, satisfied the elusive requirements of Article II even though

"[t]here is no real dispute that the functions performed by the
independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they are law
enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by
officials within the Executive Branch. ' 164
One might thus arguably derive a two-part, bright-line rule for
the constitutionality of new independent agencies from the Court's
inferior officer analysis. First, if an officer is subject to removal by
someone other than the President, inferior status follows,' 65 regardless

of the level of executive or policy-making authority endowed upon
that officer." The Supreme Court has been hard-pressed to identify a
"principal" officer below the rank of department head who is
removable by the President. 67 Second, if an officer is deemed
inferior, he may constitutionally escape presidential at-will removal
on that basis. The Court eschewed consideration of the nature and
scope of the authority exercised by an officer when it pronounced in
Edmond v. United States that "[t]he exercise of significant authority

pursuant to the laws of the United States marks, not the line between
nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate "might be inconvenient."
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10 (1879). The distinction thus became
meaningful only with the proliferation of new posts and agencies in the mid- to latetwentieth century.
164. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
165. Id. at 671 (finding independent counsel inferior because she was removable by the
Attorney General); see also, e.g., Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp.
2d 389, 419 (D. Conn. 2008) ("The fact that the [Associate Deputy Secretary] serves at the
pleasure of the Secretary and can be removed by him at any time is indicative of his
subordinate role to the Secretary."); cf. United States v. Sotomayor Vazquez, 69 F. Supp.
2d 286, 291 (D.P.R. 1999) (holding that a United States Attorney is inferior to the
Attorney General for purposes of the Appointments Clause even though the Attorney
General lacks removal power).
166. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
167. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (judge of Coast Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals is inferior); Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991)
(special trial judge is inferior); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 655 (1988) (independent
counsel is inferior); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam) (Federal
Election Commissioners are inferior); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344, 352-53 (1931) (United States commissioners are inferior); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 158 (1926) (postmaster first class is inferior); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S.
419, 424 (1901) (United States commissioners in Indian territory are inferior); United
States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (vice consuls are inferior); Ex parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371, 397-98 (1879) (election supervisors are inferior); In re Hennan, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
230, 258-59 (1839) (district court clerks are inferior); see also Weiss v. United States, 510
U.S. 163, 182 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (military judges, like ordinary commissioned
military officers, are inferior). But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that the SEC is a department head), reh'g
en banc denied, cert. granted,129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
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principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but
1 68
rather... the line between officer and non-officer.
Even absent removal power, an officer can be deemed inferior if
a court is satisfied that he is supervised or directed by someone other
than the President.1 69 In Edmond, the Court suggested that "direction
and supervision"-as distinct from the power to remove-is a critical
component to whether an officer is "inferior."' 70 Hence, if Congress
structures an agency to ensure some measure of supervision or
removal authority below the President himself, the President's
appointment and removal powers are not readily triggered.17 1
To be sure, one might take the view that Congress ought not to
be constrained in its ability to fashion agencies with independence
from presidential control and supervision. In other words, Congress's
ability to unilaterally decide whether to confer "at-will" removal
authority on the President is a reasonable outgrowth of express
168. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Indeed, courts have repeatedly found United States Attorneys "inferior" even
though they are appointed by the President because they are "directed and supervised at
some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate." United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)); see United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d
987, 999 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that United States Attorneys are "inferior" officers),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Grace, 526 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2008)
(determining that interim United States Attorneys and United States Attorneys are
"inferior" officers because they are "statutorily under the direction and control of the
Attorney General"); United States v. Sotomayor Vazquez, 69 F. Supp. 2d 286, 291 (D.P.R.
1999) ("United States Attorneys, including interim United States Attorneys, are 'inferior'
officers for Appointments Clause purposes."); see also United States v. Libby, 429 F.
Supp. 2d 27, 45 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that Patrick J. Fitzgerald, who was appointed
special counsel by the Attorney General to investigate the possible unauthorized
disclosure of classified information about Valerie Plame Wilson's affiliation to the Central
Intelligence Agency, was an inferior officer).
170. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663. Peter Strauss observes that, in permitting the Secretary
of Transportation to appoint members of the Coast Guard's Court of Criminal Appeals,
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Edmond v. United States that "in the context of a
clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important government
assignments, we think it evident that 'inferior officers' are officers whose work is directed
and supervised at some level by others who are appointed by presidential nomination with
the advice and consent of the Senate." Strauss, supra note 16, at 58 (quoting Edmond v.
United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)). Interestingly, Professor Strauss derives two
constitutional requirements from the "two halves" of this sentence-preservation of
political accountability on the one hand and direction and supervision by appointees on
the other-and suggests that there is a "disconnect" between them in the Free Enterprise
Fund case, with the PCAOB satisfying the latter but not the former. See id.
171. Because Morrison and Edmond emphasize different factors in evaluating "inferior
officer" status, these two cases have been construed as providing only "a modicum of
guidance on the distinction between principal and inferior officers." United States v.
Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
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constitutional text enabling Congress to vest the appointment of
inferior officers in someone other than the President. The problem
with construing prevailing law this way is that it fails to address the
accountability problems that arise when a policymaking, lawenforcing entity is structured to operate independent of presidential
or judicial scrutiny. By the same token, it assumes the answer to a
question the Court has never expressly addressed: whether some limit
on Congress's ability to create "non-agency" agencies severed from
traditional means of accountability is appropriate.17 2
2. What Are "Core Executive Functions"?
Second, even without the "inferior officer" loophole, Morrison's
"core functions" inquiry fails as a workable test for identifying
unconstitutional independent agency arrangements for another
critical reason: the Court neglected to engage in a substantive analysis
of what the President's "constitutionally assigned duties" are in the
first place. 173 As a consequence, the notion of "core functions"
remains indeterminate and therefore difficult to apply predictably
and non-arbitrarily in a given case. 174 The Morrison Court made clear
that the President's "take care" power contemplates some influence
on the removal process, 175 but what actual powers comprise the
President's core constitutional prerogative remains uncertain.
The Constitution bears no definition of the executive or
legislative power, and provides scant guidance on what constitutes a
"case" or "controversy" within the meaning of Article 111.176 It is
difficult "aggressively to apply textual and structural devices to
impart constitutional meaning to 'executive' ... functions. ' 177 A test

172. Some might alternatively argue that the removal-supervision-direction test for
"inferior" status provides an appropriate limit on Congress's power. Because it is easy to
draft legislation rendering an official subordinate to another, such a test remains
problematic to the extent it can be satisfied without careful scrutiny of whether the
arrangement violates broader constitutional principles.
173. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988).
174. See Lawson, supra note 30, at 1245 (opining that "[t]he absence of a functioning
unitary executive principle" may have made it possible for Congress to grant "agencies
their current, almost-limitless powers").
175. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-90 (observing that its analysis in prior removal cases
was designed to prevent congressional interference with the President's constitutionally
appointed "take care" duty).
176. See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing the Judicial Branch of government and
setting forth its powers).
177. Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 291 (1987). This may not have been an oversight on the
part of the framers: it retains flexibility as the federal apparatus evolves over time.
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that hinges on consensus around the constitutional meaning of core
executive functions, therefore, is inherently fraught with peril.
At a minimum, the Morrison Court conceded that faithful
execution of the laws is accomplished through investigation and
prosecution. 17 8 It follows that there must be some boundary of
infringement which, if crossed, tags certain encroachments on
investigative and prosecutorial power as unconstitutional under the
core functions test. Yet Morrison blurred any such boundary in
allowing the independent counsel to exercise executive power to
investigate the President himself-power which included "framing
and signing indictments ...and handling all aspects of any case, in the
name of the United States." '79 The majority reasoned that such core
functions-although belonging to the President in the first instancewere not impeded in Morrison because the President retained some
authority over the independent counsel's exercise of such functions
by virtue of the Attorney General's power to remove her for good
cause.180 Contrast this, the Court suggested, with a statute that
"completely stripped" the President of removal power. 8
Presumably, Congress could not "completely strip" the President
of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers by creating a freestanding agency outside the tripartite system, with members
appointed by someone other than the President, and removable byand thus answerable to-no one. So long as independent agencies are
per se constitutional, 82 however, it is difficult realistically to conceive

178. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691; see also id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the independent counsel possesses full power to exercise all investigative and
prosecutorial functions of the Attorney General and Department of Justice, and therefore
the independent counsel's functions are executive and infringe upon separation of
powers). Congress exercises a similar function with its legislative powers to obtain
information through congressional investigations and punish refusals to testify with
contempt, although the Supreme Court has made clear that this power is not to be
confused with the powers of law enforcement assigned to the executive branch and the
judiciary, and is subject to constitutional constraints such as the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161
(1955); see also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (noting that legislative
investigatory powers have "long been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate").
179. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 662), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 2378 (2009).
180. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695-96.
181. Id. at 692.
182. In Morrison, the Court reiterated its holding in Humphrey's Executor "that the
Constitution did not give the President 'illimitable power of removal' over the officers of
independent agencies." Id. at 687 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 629 (1935)).
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of an agency structure that would satisfy the Morrison Court's
rhetorical outlier. The Court has effectively held that limitations on

the President's power to remove board or commission members do
not "completely strip" the President of his removal power, regardless
of the scope of executive power exercised by them.183 It has effectively

held that limitations on the President's power to remove officers
exercising unfettered investigative and prosecutorial discretion do not
"completely strip" the President of his removal power, either. 8" The

Court has also made clear that Congress cannot retain the power to
remove appointed officers. 8 5 So what did it mean in referring to a
hypothetical statute that "completely strips" the President of removal
power? Such impermissible legislation would, in theory, lodge such

power either exclusively in the courts, in a government agency, or in a
private party. Although the Constitution allows Congress to give
courts the power to appoint inferior officers,'86 a statute that shifted

from the President to the courts the power to appoint principal
officers would presumably be unconstitutional on separation-ofpowers grounds.'8 7 But what about shifting that power to agencies?
Again, a statute that allowed an agency to appoint a Cabinet-level
official would likely be unconstitutional. But so long as Congress
sandwiches a layer of bureaucracy between the President and the
official in question, his resulting inferior status would protect
legislation constraining the President's removal power from an
Appointments Clause challenge, regardless of whether broader

constitutional principles relating to "core executive power" are in
play. As a practical matter, therefore, Morrison may well "create[] a
safe harbor for independent agencies"-such as the PCAOB-whose

members are appointed and removed by another independent
agency.188
183. See id.
184. Id. The Court has not resolved whether independent agencies are departments.
See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 887 n.4 (1991) (reserving this question). Thus, the
Court might entertain an argument that the SEC cannot appoint (and thus cannot
remove) inferior officers because it is not a department and its five Commissioners are not
department heads. As Justice Scalia observed in his Freytag concurrence, however, this
argument does not make much sense so long as Humphrey's Executor remains good law.
Id. at 920-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see also Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 712 n.24
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Scalia's concurrence).
185. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
186. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
187. Cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) (finding unconstitutional on
separation of powers grounds a statute that enabled removal of postmasters only with the
advice and consent of the Senate).
188. Stack, supra note 148, at 441.
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The dissenting D.C. Circuit judge in Free Enterprise Fund
attempted to distinguish Morrison because, unlike the PCAOB, the
independent counsel's jurisdiction was confined, her tenure was
restricted, and her duties were limited by DOJ policies. 189 Every
Cabinet-level appointee, however, has limited jurisdiction and limited
duties. And even the Attorney General must abide by DOJ policies.
Moreover, it was the independent counsel who "determined when her
statutory duties were complete," and she could request that her
prosecutorial jurisdiction be expanded.19 ° As the headline-grabbing
Whitewater investigation suggested, this aspect of the statute
operated to enlarge the prosecutorial freedom of the independent
" ' Unlike a line prosecutor faced with
counsel.19
finite resources and
policy preferences of the Attorney General and main DOJ, the
independent counsel's budget was unlimited and she answered on a
day-to-day basis to no one. Despite best efforts, therefore, the facts of
Morrison make it hard to condemn legislation that severs executive
officials from presidential control.
Scholars have attempted to distill executive power beyond the
tasks of investigation and prosecution. A key battlefront concerns the
question of whether Article II establishes presidential control over
agencies' discretionary authority or whether Congress may vest such
authority in subordinate officers free from direct control of the
President."9 Geoffrey Miller argues, for example, that "[t]he
President retains the constitutional power to direct the officer to take
particular actions within his or her discretion or to refrain from acting
when the officer has discretion not to act," and that Congress may not
constitutionally deny the President the power to remove officials who

189. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d. at 708 n.17 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 682 (majority opinion).
191. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the Wrong Lessons from History: Why There
Must Be an Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 1-2 (2000).

192. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 10 (observing that, for believers in a
strongly unitary executive, "the so-called independent agencies are in conspicuous
violation of the Constitution"); see also Lawson, supra note 30, at 1241 (describing
scholarly debate). But see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 20-30 (debunking the

unitary executive theory and arguing that, historically, prosecutors were not answerable to
the President, nor were all departments according to the framing Congress). Thus far,
"[n]o modern judicial decision specifically addresses the President's power either directly
to make all discretionary decisions within the executive department or to nullify the

actions of insubordinate subordinates." Lawson, supra note 30, at 1244; see also Thomas
0. McGarity, PresidentialControl of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 443, 465-66 (1987) (discussing the implications of the executive power on

discretionary decisions and Congress's power to vest that authority in subordinates).
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do not cooperate with such directives.193 Under this theory,
Humphrey's Executor was wrongly decided because a statute that
limits the President's removal to specified "cause" would interfere

with his core executive functions. If the Take Care Clause is
construed as creating presidential power to direct how the laws are
executed, the PCAOB may be problematic because neither the SEC

nor the President retain the power under the Act to direct the day-today operation of PCAOB inspections, investigations, or enforcement
actions.'94 The plaintiffs in Free Enterprise Fund advanced this

viewpoint, arguing that "the President must retain the exclusive
removal authority over those executing the laws," '95 which extends
well beyond Cabinet-level officials to " 'the lowest officers, the
middle grade, and the highest.' "196

Other theorists argue that the President can express discontent
with principal officers by removing them-either for their own
misconduct or for mismanagement of inferior officers or employees-9 7
but lacks the authority to direct the exercise of their discretion.

Under this theory of executive power, the framers envisioned some
measure of separation between the President and other executive
officials, from whom he could seek guidance but who exercise a
degree of independent discretion. 9 ' Accordingly, the Take Care

Clause empowers the President to make sure that the executive
193. Miller, supra note 1, at 44. This theory of executive power is more than a purely
academic exercise in the conceivable. As Harold Krent has observed, President George
W. Bush's "centralization efforts, even in routine administrative matters, have stretched
our understanding of the unitary executive almost beyond recognition." Harold J. Krent,
From a Unitary to a UnilateralPresidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523, 524 (2008); cf. Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2, 40 ("[T]he view that the framers constitutionalized anything
like [the unitary executive] is a myth.... [T]he framers meant to constitutionalize just
some of what we now think of as 'executive power,' leaving the balance to Congress to
structure as it thought proper.").
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c) (2006) (giving the Board authority to direct day-to-day
inspections, investigations, and enforcement actions). This tension figured prominently in
Free Enterprise Fund, with the dissenting judge arguing that the President's Article II
powers afford him the constitutional prerogative to direct the exercise of the PCAOB's
discretion and to remove Board members for noncompliance. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d
at 687 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
195. Brief of Appellants, supra note 85, at 15 (emphasis added).
196. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 499 (Joseph Gales ed., Washington, D.C.,
Gales & Seaton 1834) (remarks of Madison)).
197. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992) (describing
three models of the unitary executive, the weakest of which recognizes the President's
power to remove principal officers at will but maintains that his subordinates' exercise of
discretionary executive power remains valid until revoked by a successor).
198. See id.
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branch officers do not flout or ignore the law-that they execute it
faithfully-but it is not an independent source of presidential
power. 199 Because the President would not be entitled to fire an
official for failure to exercise his or her discretion in a desired
manner, a statute that bars the President from removing officers on
such grounds is constitutional under this narrower conception of
executive power.
Although Humphrey's Executor comports with a theory of
executive power that tolerates agency decision making independent
of presidential oversight, the Court has never clearly defined the
scope of core executive power to control agency activity. The
Morrison Court suggested that the independent counsel's authority to
"exercise[] no small amount of discretion and judgment in deciding
how to carry out.., her duties under the Act" did not constitutionally
require unfettered removal power on the part of the President. °°
Nevertheless, the Court was fundamentally persuaded that, because
the independent counsel could be controlled indirectly through the
Attorney General, the statute did not impermissibly infringe on
executive power.2 ' In theory, the foregoing passage from Morrison
means that that the President constitutionally possesses directory
authority, but the statute did not interfere with it. It is equally
possible that the President lacks such authority, so the statute's
impact on his ability to direct agency officials' discretion is irrelevant.
The Court did not identify the premise underlying its rhetoric.
Because the PCAOB is not controlled by a principal officer wholike the Attorney General-can be removed at will by the President,
the question remains whether endowing removal authority on
someone whom the President could only fire for cause would
"interfere" with his core functions. And that question cannot be
answered without first identifying what core functions belong to the
President, which Morrison failed to do.
Richard Pierce offers a possible definition of "core functions" by
suggesting a policymaking definition of executive power: "It seems
near certain that the framers intended the politically accountable
branches to make all policy decisions except those incident to the
process of adjudicating cases under the Constitution, statutes, and the
199. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to be Done: An Essay on
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253,275 (2003) (describing the Take Care Clause as imposing a duty

rather than as conferring power).
200. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
201. See id. at 671-72.
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common law." 2" Without rejecting "for cause" limitations on the
President's removal power, therefore, he argues that " 'cause' must
include failure to comply with any valid policy decision made by the
President or his agent. 20 3 As a consequence, the President could not
remove an independent counsel for having unearthed politically
damaging evidence, but could do so for violating a generally
applicable policy established by the President or his agents. This
policymaking thesis is consistent with Morrison, in which the Court
highlighted that the independent counsel's authority did "not include
any authority to formulate
policy for the Government or the
4

Executive Branch.

,20

Although the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund condemned the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in part because the PCAOB enjoys broad
authority to promulgate rules, among other things,2 °5 the PCAOB
may well pass muster under a policymaking standard. While it has the
authority to promulgate rules, the rules are subject to SEC review.0 6
In this way, it operates like a negotiating committee that drafts a
proposed rule for SEC Commissioners' consideration-the SEC is
ultimately responsible for the policy choice once the rule is
finalized. 2 7 There is no mechanism for judicial review of the
PCAOB's failure to regulate,208 but nothing constrains the SEC from
promulgating rules itself to fill such gaps. And even though the
PCAOB's investigatory and prosecutorial decisions are largely
202. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure
of Government, 1988 SuP. Cr. REV. 1, 24.
203. Id. at 25; cf. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 118 ("[A] removal standard
would be unconstitutional if it ... entirely eliminated presidential control over general
policy decisions.").
204. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671. Other scholars sharply dispute the notion that the
substantive hallmark of executive power is policymaking. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes,
supra note 197, at 1170 (discussing the competing view that Congress has the

constitutional authority to divest the President of executive power); Lee S. Liberman,
Morrison v. Olson: A FormalisticPerspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L.
REV. 313, 324 (1989) (suggesting that the President is obliged to adhere to prior policy

decisions under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution).
205. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 704-05

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("PCAOB members have extraordinarily
broad power under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to, among other things, promulgate
rules, initiate and conduct investigations and inspections, compel testimony, and impose
sanctions."), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted,129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(2) (2006) ("No rule of the Board shall become effective

without prior approval of the Commission....").
207. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (2006).
208. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a)-(b) (2006) (declaring the PCAOB "not ... an
agency"), with 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706(1) (providing that judicial review applies only to
statutorily-defined "agenc[ies]"), and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (same).
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immune from judicial review, law enforcement functions do not
involve policymaking. If the independent counsel is not making policy
by investigating and prosecuting under federal criminal laws, in other
words, the PCAOB is not doing so in policing compliance with
auditing standards for accountants. Perhaps, therefore, the Act's
provisions for SEC review of the Board's rulemaking save it from
serious constitutional challenge under a policymaking definition of
"core functions." Ironically, this standard turns the one relatively
settled definition of executive power on its head: because traditional
law enforcement does not involve policymaking, the President's
authority to remove the Attorney General and senior prosecutors
could, in theory, be confined to "cause." Of course, neither Morrison
nor prior cases on appointment and removal endorsed "for cause"
limits on the President's power to remove Cabinet-level officials such
as the Attorney General. A policymaking explication of core
executive functions, therefore, would not resolve the definitional
problems Morrison left bare.
3. Does Limited Removal Power Interfere with a "Core Function"?
Practicality and Efficiency Concerns
Even assuming a definition of "core functions," Morrison leaves
no clear standard for identifying whether a given scheme
impermissibly "interferes" with those functions. The Court did accept
that investigation and prosecution are quintessentially executive
functions but found that the independent counsel scheme did not
impermissibly interfere with them because the President retained
some indirect control (through the Attorney General) over removal
of the independent counsel.209 If an inferior officer is not supervised
or removable by the Attorney General or a Cabinet-level equivalent,
then, does that render the President's core functions compromised?
Morrison provides no obvious means of answering that question.
Wherever the boundary for impermissible interference lies, Morrison
210
merely teaches that the independent counsel statute did not cross it.
One way to get at the meaning of "interference" without arriving
at a definitive understanding of "core executive functions" is to
consider the constitutional purpose behind a single-headed executive
branch. The Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II reflect a
well-documented decision by the framers of the Constitution to vest

209. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695-96 (1988).
210. Id. at 696-97.
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all executive responsibilities in one person rather than a committee.2 11
As the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund observed, "[a] single head of

the Executive Branch enhances efficiency and energy in the
administration of the Government," regardless of the breadth or
narrowness of executive power.212 Thus, as an addendum to the core
functions test, one might look to whether limitations on the
President's power to appoint and remove officials undermine the
efficiency rationale behind the unitary executive embodied in the
Constitution. As with the core functions test itself, however,
practicality and efficiency concerns do not provide a workable test for
identifying the limits of congressional authority to create agencies
that operate independent of presidential control.
The efficiency rationale for preserving presidential at-will
removal authority made more sense in 1787 than it does today.2 13 In

modern times, the very goal of efficiency borders on the spurious in
light of the gargantuan

administrative bureaucracy, which has

increased dramatically in size and scope over the past century.214
Accompanying the expansion of the administrative state, moreover,

has been the analogous increase in the size of the bureaucracy in and
around the White House itself.215 The number of political employees
within the White House has increased ten-fold over the last forty
years and four-fold over the last decade.1 6 When viewed against the
211. See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional
Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L.
REV. 62, 72 (1990); Robert V. Percival, PresidentialManagement of the Administrative
State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967 (2001); see also Miller, supra

note 1, at 70 (discussing the rejection of the council idea at the Constitutional
Convention).
212. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 689 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted,129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009). In addition to serving
the values of efficiency and accountability (discussed below), the unitary executive fosters
coordination, avoids factionalism, and enables the President to act with dispatch. Lessig
and Sunstein, supra note 32, at 94-95.
213. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, On the ConstitutionalStatus of Administrative Agencies,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 509-10 (1987) (observing that the President oversees modern
agencies but cannot participate in all subordinates' decisions).
214. See David C. Vladeck, Commentary, The Administrative Conference's Role in
Promoting Government Efficiency Today, Tomorrow, and Next Year, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 697, 698 (1994) ("[T]he need to simplify and streamline the nation's administrative
state has only increased in recent years.").
215. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who
Would Distortand Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive, By Steven G. Calabresi
and Christopher Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (manuscript on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
216. Id. (manuscript at 19) (citing PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY
164 (2007)).
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thousands of appointed officials and federal employees within the
numerous executive and independent agencies that comprise the
broader administrative bureaucracy, the White House seems
miniscule in comparison. Yet "[i]t is simply impossible for the
21 7
president to control the White House, much less the bureaucracy.
As Richard Pierce explains:
There are not enough hours in the day for the president to be
aware of more than a tiny fraction of the policy decisions that
are made by agencies every day. Moreover, the chain of agency
relationships between the president and the people who
actually make policy decisions in the bureaucracy is far too long
to indulge the assumption that everyone in the White House
who purports to speak for the president is acting consistently
with the president's policy preferences.218
Thus, although there are virtues-rooted in the Constitution-to
having a single leader who brings policy in line with a set of principles
on which the President was elected, as a practical matter this
justification for unfettered appointment and at-will removal authority
only goes so far.
Notwithstanding the elusiveness of efficiency as a goal for
executive administration, practicality is a troubling basis for
marginalizing the unitary executive theory that animates Article II.
Presumably, avoidance of fractious executive control is partly why the
framers left it to the President alone to appoint principal officers, and
why the cluster of people who populate that category might be
expanded-if anything-rather than narrowed with the swelling of
the administrative state. The fact that the President cannot effectively
orchestrate along a single note the entire federal bureaucracy is a
poor reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater. He certainly
can connect with a key group of officers who work at his pleasure.
Under prevailing Supreme Court precedent, however, the
independent agency model enables* Congress to configure
substantively powerful agencies "independent" of the President so
long as a layer of bureaucracy cushions officials from presidential
control.219 This construction of the legislative power stands in tension
with the unitary executive model the framers envisioned.

217. Id. (manuscript at 16).
218. Id.
219. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, one purpose of the early independent agency was to
frustrate presidential control.220 Its existence, therefore, forces a
choice between the efficient administration of a unitary executive and
the virtues of agency independence. Morrison accepts the
consequence that under some circumstances, it is appropriate to
compromise efficiency values for the benefit of something greater.
The question then becomes: what values are sufficiently important to
trump the need for the efficient administration of executive
government? There is no easy way to concoct a framework for
analysis that produces a clear answer to this question-it is again
ultimately unsatisfying because it seems too subjective.
One possibility is to consider the historical justification for
independent agencies: the corrosive effect of politics on the
democratically-responsive
operation of government. Morrison
occurred in the wake of the Watergate scandal.22 ' The idea behind the
independent counsel law was to avoid a repeat of the so-called
"Saturday Night Massacre" whereby President Nixon dismissed
special prosecutor Archibald Cox, who was appointed by the
Attorney General.2 22 The perceived need to ensure effective
investigation and prosecution of wrongdoing at the highest levels of
government, in other words, outweighed the efficiency rationale for a
unitary executive that would no doubt be undermined by the
independent counsel law. This idea probably made sense at the time.
Because no President is above the law, no President should dictate
investigations into his own conduct; were he to do so, it would hardly
facilitate the efficient operation of the executive branch as a whole.

220. In its seminal decision validating the appointment and removal structure of the
FrC, therefore, the Supreme Court considered the "coercive influence" of presidential
removal power a threat to agencies' ability to act with independence. Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935). As Geoffrey Miller has observed, "[tihe case was
decided in the thick of the bitter battle over the constitutionality of the New Deal [and]
may well have reflected reservations about the danger of overwhelming presidential
power-a concern that had not inconsiderable force during the early days of the Roosevelt
Administration." Miller, supra note 1, at 94. Later, the Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to the War Claims Commission, which was established to hear certain claims
arising out of World War II because that body was designed to be "entirely free from the
control or coercive influence" of the President and to adjudicate claims strictly "according
to law." Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355 (1958).
221. See George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us-Salinas, Sun-Diamond, and
Two Views of the Anti-Corruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747, 804-07 (2000) (describing
events giving rise to the independent counsel statute and the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison).
222. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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The independent counsel statute, however, was not renewed. 223 Not
only did the investigations drag on for dubious benefit at enormous
cost to the taxpayers, but in hindsight it became evident that the
public outcry over President Nixon's actions and the scrutiny imposed
by the press operated to bring down the President regardless of
whether Cox stayed in office. 224 The need for a truly independent
prosecutor may have been largely illusory. Whether independent
agencies in fact operate as they were intended-that is, divorced from
political influence and driven by facts and science versus loyalty to
the current White House occupant-is similarly debatable.225
Even assuming arguendo that independence from the President
does ensure objective policymaking by executive branch
subordinates, it cannot be denied that such independence comes at a
cost. The cost, of course, is presidential power and unitary control.
The argument for independence is, by its very nature, at odds with the
conclusion that the President wields control over independent
agencies. Although the Court long-ago established that "for cause"
limitations on the President's removal power are an acceptable price
to pay for independence,22 6 it has laid no viable groundwork for
determining when the price becomes too high.
Congress conceived of the PCAOB as peculiarly independent. Its
independence is uniquely fortified by the "double for-cause"
structure for removal of its members. There is no evidence that
Congress had the Appointments Clause and removal precedent in
mind when, in the words of Senator Gramm, it endowed the Board
with "massive power, unchecked power, by design," for use in
"mak[ing] decisions that affect all accountants and everybody they
work for, which directly or indirectly is every breathing person in this
'
Once the inherent tension between independence and
country."227
presidential control is acknowledged, it becomes difficult to argue
persuasively that the need for independence trumps fidelity to the

223. See Stephan 0. Kline, Heal It, Don't Bury It! Testimony on Reauthorizationof the
Independent Counsel Act, 1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 51, 56-67 ("[Sjome commentators
suggest that the firing of Archibald Cox shows that the prosecutorial system functioned
perfectly well before the 1978 law came into existence."); cf Stack, supra note 148, at 440
("Independent Counsel Starr's investigation turned the political tables on the independent
counsel statute.").
224. See Stack, supra note 148, at 409 ("[W]hile the Watergate special prosecutor
model allowed politics to trump legal process in the short term, it was not without political
accountability for President Nixon.").
225. See supra note 49.
226. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
227. 148 CONG. REC. 12,119 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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principle of a unitary executive. Nothing in the Constitution compels
the former. Yet the latter arises from historical records
contemporaneous to the Constitution22 8 and implicit in Article II
itself: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."22' 9 Thus, the argument that presidential
appointment and at-will removal power is necessary to ensure
efficient coordination of the executive branch is a valid one.
The efficiency rationale for a unitary executive extends well
beyond the novelties of the PCAOB, however, and bears upon the
propriety of independent agencies per se. There is not much to be
gained, therefore, in employing it as a standard for testing future
iterations of the independent agency model. Under prevailing case
law, it is hard to make the argument that restraints on presidential
removal and appointment power interfere with the efficiency
objective of a unitary executive. Independent agencies are here to
stay. The Court has repeatedly tolerated curtailment of the
President's at-will removal power.2 0 A retreat from these authorities
based on an argument that the efficiency benefits of a unitary
executive must be protected could not be accomplished without
substantial retraction of precedents that have been in place for over
three-quarters of a century.
Moreover, even if an efficient executive branch were the driving
objective behind the question of interference with core presidential
functions,2 3' scholars debate whether removal plays a meaningful role
in ensuring agency adherence to the President's agenda.232 The
President exercises control over agency bureaucracy in ways that
might satisfy Morrison's core functions test even if a statute
completely separates him from the locus of removal power. A string
of executive orders have long authorized the Office of Information
and Regulatory Analysis ("OIRA") within the President's Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") to monitor agency compliance

228. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1385, 1406-07 (2008) (discussing views of Hamilton and Madison supporting a
unitary executive).
229. U.S. CONST. art. II (emphasis added).
230. See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
231. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988).
232. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 215 (manuscript at 13-17) (arguing that most executive
branch officers are incentivized to act in a manner consistent with the President's
objectives regardless of the removal power, and that "for cause" restrictions on removal
are unimportant).
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with various regulatory analysis requirements.2 33 Moreover, as
Richard Pierce recently observed, the "[l]argely invisible ad hoc
White House jawboning is now, and always has been, far more
important in its impact on agency policy decisions. "234 A phone call
from Vice President Cheney to a relatively low-level agency
appointee prompted shifts in policy decisions during the Bush
Administration that rippled to the upper echelons of the agency.235
And even absent a statutory obstacle to removal power, the political
costs of removing a presidential appointee can be too high to
entertain.2 36 President Nixon's removal of Attorney General Elliot
Richardson ultimately led to the end of his presidency. 237 Given these
other means of influencing agency activity, the President's "core
functions" might not be impeded even if his removal power were
"completely stripped" with respect to a certain officer.238
At bottom, the Court's historical approach to the question of the
constitutionality of independent agencies has been ad hoc and
outcome determinative. It lacks any guiding theoretical principle that
might withstand the idiosyncrasies of the modern regulatory state. In
this regard, the "core executive functions" rhetoric of Morrison is
misleading. The Court failed to define core executive functions or
provide standards for recognizing when legislation impermissibly
interferes with them. To the extent that some limiting principles
exist-such as consideration of the purposes behind a unitary
executive, the President's policy-making role, or the classic executive
functions of investigation and prosecution-the facts of Morrison
deprive them of any real force. As a result, litigants seeking to
challenge or defend legislation establishing an unprecedented agency
structure are largely left to distinguish the facts of Morrison, that is,
how the specifics of new legislation compare to the challenged
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. The dissent in Free
233.
(1988);
13,422,
234.

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 4 U.S.C. § 601
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No.
72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007). See Pierce, supra note 215 (manuscript at 13).
Pierce, supra note 215 (manuscript at 13); see also Lisa Bressman & Michael

Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
PresidentialControl, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 69-70 (2008) (concluding that various White

House offices and the OIRA attempted to control rulemaking at EPA).
235. See Pierce, supra note 215 (manuscript at 14) (discussing Jo Becker & Barton
Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at Al (describing the
Department of Interior's reversal of the decision regarding dam operation after Vice
President Cheney communicated with the nineteenth ranking person at the agency)).
236. Id. (manuscript at 9) (discussing the high cost of exercising removal power).
237. Id.
238. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988).
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EnterpriseFund struggled mightily to demonstrate, for example, that
the independent counsel's tenure was limited in duration and that the
SEC is less susceptible to presidential control than the Attorney
General.2 39 Hinging the constitutionality of the Act on such features
seems patternless and subjective; that Morrison demands such an
analysis is a testament to its failure to replace the obsolete "quasi-"
approach of Humphrey's Executor with a meaningful constitutional
standard. Because Congress will continue to experiment with new
agency forms, the Court should derive a workable standard from
enduring constitutional principles rather than tinker at the margins of
the elusive meaning of executive power.
C.

The Promising-butIncomplete-PresidentialAccountability
Concept

A possible alternative to the core functions test would consider
the constitutionality of independent agencies from an important
structural premise implicit in the Constitution: officers within the
executive branch are accountable to the public through the President.
In his famous opinion in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,24 Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that,
"[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
'
Executive is."241
A "presidential accountability" approach sidesteps
the thorny definition of core executive functions while serving up a
broad principle from which a meaningful standard might be derived.
As with an approach to core executive functions that closely tethers
the President to the powers of investigation, prosecution, or policy
making, or strives to serve the efficiency justification for a unitary
executive, however, a test that looks exclusively to an agency's
accountability to the President cannot operate alone within existing
doctrine.
A presidential accountability approach would build on the
Supreme Court's premise that "one who holds his office only during
the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an
'
attitude of independence against the latter's will."242
If an officer
239. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 708-09
n.17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 2378 (2009). The dissenting opinion was not particularly persuasive on these points.
See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
240. 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
241. Id. at 865.
242. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935); see Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) (noting that the Appointments Clause was "designed to preserve
political accountability"); see also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)
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understands that the President can fire her at any point for any
reason, she will strive to conform to the President's directives and
agenda for fear of losing her job.2143 Reciprocally, the President is
responsible to the electorate for the successes and failures of such an
"alter ego" in effectuating the platform on which he was elected. If
the President is too far removed from that official's chain of
command, he cannot reasonably be held accountable for the official's
mistakes.
The Board is exceedingly remote from electoral accountability.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act affords the President no power to appoint
and remove Board members. 2" The recipient of such power-the
SEC-is not democratically elected. The Act would thus be
susceptible to challenge under a presidential accountability approach.
Because the Court appeared satisfied in Humphrey's Executor
and Morrison that affording the President only indirect removal
power does not per se render the government actor unaccountable,
the question raised by a presidential accountability approach is how
much independence is too much. This question may be hard to
answer by looking simply at the length of the chain of command to
the President. The SEC is effectively in charge of the PCAOB and
exercises greater oversight than the Attorney General exercised
under the independent counsel statute.24 5 But the Act creating the
PCAOB is distinguishable from the independent counsel statute
because the SEC-unlike the Attorney General-is not removable at
will. 246 There is certainly a more tenuous accountability track under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and no method under prevailing law for
determining when that track becomes too lengthy. The Morrison
Court hung its hat on a finding of "inferior" status:247 if the PCAOB is
inferior, it follows, the question of presidential removal melts away.
But such a technical holding obscures the very real dilemma posed by
the PCAOB. The idea behind presidential control is a fundamentally
democratic one: if the President appoints and the agency makes
("The power to remove officers... is a powerful tool for control."); see Strauss, supra note
16, at 58 (deriving accountability requirement from Edmond); supra note 169.
243. But see supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text (discussing debate over

whether removal actually operates to ensure agency compliance with the President's
agenda).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4) (2006)

(providing that the SEC will appoint Board

members).
245. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685
(D.C. Cir. 2008), reh'g en bane denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
246. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
247. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988).
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mistakes, the voters can hold the President accountable for the alter
ego's misdeeds. Such accountability is missing under the Act because
the SEC is unelected, and no single President is realistically

responsible for appointing all of its members. 48
The executive, moreover, is the only democratically-elected
branch that can hold officials accountable through the power of
removal under Supreme Court case law involving congressional
attempts to reserve removal power for itself. Congress cannot
participate in the appointment or removal of officials charged with
executing the law except by impeachment.2 49 The Court thus took

care in Morrison to provide reassurance that the independent counsel
law "d[id] not involve an attempt by Congress itself to gain a role in
the removal of executive officials other than its established powers of
impeachment and conviction.""2 '
Ostensibly, Congress made no attempt in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act to afford itself any unconstitutional influence in the removal of
Board members. On the one hand, then, the inquiry as to whether the
statute expressly aggrandizes congressional power at the President's
expense supports the conclusion that the Act is constitutional. The
power to remove Board members lies exclusively with the SEC.
On the other hand, the Act should fail under a presidential
accountability approach precisely because no democratically elected
branch of government can remove Board members. Whereas
Congress is constitutionally forbidden from involving itself in the
248. Moreover, as Part III, infra, explains, the notion of separation of powers is
premised on a balancing of powers between the three primary branches. Here, the
"balance" is provided by an independent hybrid entity-the SEC. There is no pretense
that the President exercises the real power here. The SEC does. But the idea that balance
derives from some quasi-executive entity that is only marginally responsible to the
President distracts from the basic concept of three separated powers.
249. Myers v. United States involved a statute which provided that certain postmasters
could be removed only "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 272 U.S. 52,
106 (1925). The President removed a postmaster unilaterally, and a lawsuit followed. The
Court declared the statute unconstitutional on the ground that for Congress to "draw to
itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the
exercise of that power ... would be ...to infringe the constitutional principle of the
separation of governmental powers." Id. at 161. The Court applied this principle again in
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (rebuffing Congress's attempt to control
spending by appointing the Comptroller General of the United States to monitor
compliance with spending limitations and vesting removal power in itself). Similarly, in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132, 137 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected Congress's
attempt to vest in itself the power to appoint members of the Federal Election
Commission to the extent that they are charged with tasks that do not merely aid in the
operation of congressional legislative authority.
250. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686.
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removal process, the President's authority is limited to firing certain
SEC Commissioners for cause for failing to persuade the SEC as a
whole to fire PCAOB members for cause (assuming that such "cause"
even encompasses whatever problem the President has with the
PCAOB's actions). The problem with this argument is that the Court
has consistently endorsed the constitutionality of agency
independence from the President." 1 If it turns out that the
Constitution requires a clear line of accountability to the President
for agency officials, existing "for cause" limitations on the President's
removal powers become fundamentally suspect to the extent that
statutory "cause" excludes the act or omission for which the President
seeks to hold an officer accountable.
The Court could draw a line at the facts of Morrison and hold
that independent agencies are tolerable only if their members are
appointed and removed by the President or a Cabinet-level officer
who is removable at will.252 After all, the President's ability to remove
the Attorney General for any reason rendered the independent
counsel more accountable to the President than the PCAOB by
comparison. Such a distinction is somewhat arbitrary, however, as the
very purpose of the independent counsel statute was to insulate
prosecution of senior executive officials from presidential control. It
begs the question of whether removal power is an effective tool for
ensuring accountability to the President. Thus, although
accountability is fertile ground on which to plant a seed for an
alternative framework for assessing limits on the President's
appointment and removal power, it cannot do the job alone within
existing doctrine.
Another analytical thread lies dormant in the aforementioned
case law barring Congress from retaining removal authority for itself.
Fundamental
separation-of-powers
principles-and
not
the
aggrandizement of congressional power for its own sake-drove these
decisions. 5 3 In Bowsher v. Synar,254 the Court rebuffed Congress's
attempt to control spending by vesting in itself the power to remove
the Comptroller General of the United States, 255 emphasizing that the
tripartite system "was deliberately so structured... to provide
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 60 (observing that the fact that the SEC as a whole is
responsible for appointment and removal of Board members distinguishes the PCAOB
from similar entities).
253. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722.
254. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
255. Id.
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avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of government
power. '256 The ban on congressional removal power thus sprung from
" '[t]he fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three
general departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others.' ,257 As
Part III suggests, this bedrock concept of balanced powers should
prominently inform the propriety of modern attempts by Congress to
relieve the President of his traditional role in appointing and
removing independent agency members or commissioners for cause.
III.

TOWARD A REVISED FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOVEL INDEPENDENT AGENCY
STRUCTURES

This Part seizes upon the theory animating the ban on
congressional attempts to retain removal authority and suggests that
courts evaluate modern infringements on the President's appointment
and removal power from the perspective of a particular facet of
separation-of-powers theory: ensuring proper checks and balances.
This framework departs from an accountability approach in one
significant respect. Rather than look at presidential power in
isolation, it scrutinizes the posture of a given independent agency
relative to all three branches of government. The question is, are
there sufficient checks and balances on the actions of the agency to
satisfy the conventions of separation of powers theory? By enabling
meaningful judicial scrutiny of new independent agency forms, such
an approach could operate to reign in legislative efforts to insulate
entities exercising executive power from traditional means of
ensuring accountability without disturbing the viability of existing
independent agencies.
The objective here is merely to outline the preliminary features
of such an approach, beginning with a description of the proposal and
then applying it to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the process, this Part
identifies how this alternative method for establishing boundaries on
Congress's ability to fashion new independent agencies improves
upon the methods discussed thus far.

256. Id.
257. Id. at 725 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30
(1935)).
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A Checks-and-BalancesApproach to Appointment and Removal

Laurence Tribe has remarked that, "to decide major cases," it
may "be necessary to extrapolate what amounts to a blueprint of
organizational relationships from the fundamental structural
' As
postulates one sees as informing the Constitution as a whole."258
argued in Part II, the inherent shortcomings of the approach in
Morrison highlight a need for an alternative analysis derived from
general constitutional tenets. Given the limitations of an approach
that would look exclusively to an agency's structural posture vis-A-vis
the President, review of entities like the PCAOB would benefit from
an analysis that borrows from broader principles of separation of
powers, in particular, the need to ensure sufficient checks and
balances.
The doctrine of separation of powers concerns "the distribution
of powers among the three coequal Branches... ; it does not speak to
the manner in which authority is parceled out within a single
' Although not express in the Constitution, the doctrine is
Branch."259
inferred from the document's organizing principles.26 As the
Supreme Court has explained,26' its purpose is to prevent any one
branch from exercising the whole power of another, or from
62
exercising the fundamental powers of the government as a whole.
The separation of powers presumes some common understanding of
what activities are appropriate to the legislature, the courts, and the
President, but contains no immutable rules; it "is a structural
safeguard, or prophylactic device" that is, by design, "sufficiently
flexible to permit practical arrangements in a complex
government. "263
The important separation-of-powers flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act is not that the statute diminishes presidential power in favor of a
coordinate branch of government. After all, the power holder under
the Act is another independent agency-the SEC. Fundamental
separation-of-powers principles are implicated because the Act
effectively enables the PCAOB to conduct investigations, inspections,
and enforcement actions independent of any direct oversight by one
of the three branches of government, thus rendering it reasonably

258. TRIBE, supra note 39, at 130.

259. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1991) (citation omitted).
260. 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 215 (2005) (citation omitted).
261. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
262. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 246 (1998).

263. 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 217.
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accountable to none of them. 264 The remaining question is whether
the doctrine's flexibility tolerates such a diversion from the framers'
explicit (three-branch) and implicit (designed to preclude
overreaching by any one branch) structural plan.
To address legislative attempts to render agencies increasingly
independent of the three branches of government, an alternative
approach to reviewing the constitutionality of unprecedented agency
forms would turn on one particular aspect of the doctrine-the
concept of checks and balances. The structure of the Constitution
operates to diffuse power. 265 The separateness of the branches
"permit[s] a working interdependence in which each branch, in
guarding its own prerogatives, effectively checks and balances selfinterested behavior by the other branches. ' 266 In doing so, they
collectively "protect the governed from arbitrary oppressive acts on
the part of those in political authority. '267 As a consequence, the
separation of powers inherent in the Constitution ensures an order of
checks and balances.268 As Chaihark Hahm recently explained:
The idea is that, since power that is left unchecked tends to
enlarge itself and become arrogant and abusive, a mechanism
must be set in place to counter that tendency. Power must be
divided into smaller parts so that it becomes less threatening, or
it should be counterbalanced by another power of similar size
and strength so that it does not become larger and stronger. It
was in this vein that James Madison famously
remarked,
269
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
Accordingly, if legislation establishing agency independence leaves an
entity with insufficiently checked power within the tripartite system, it
may be constitutionally infirm even if it satisfies the porous

264. See infra Part III.B.2-3.
265. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D § 247 (explaining

that the

Constitution

prevents

concentration of power).
266. Sargentich, supra note 28, at 435.
267. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 215 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
616 n.7 (2000)).
268. Id. § 217 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381-82 (1989)).
269. Chaihark Hahm, Ritual and Constitutionalism:Disputingthe Ruler's Legitimacy in
a Confucian Polity, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 135, 136 (2009) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51,
at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)); see also BERNARD
BAILYN, To BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS

AND AMBIGUITIES OF THE

AMERICAN FOUNDERS 48 (2003) ("Only structural balances within a government,
Madison thought, pitting one force against another, could keep the misuse of power in
check and so protect minority rights.").
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Appointments Clause framework established by Humphrey's
Executor and Morrison.27 °
This "checks-and-balances" test of the constitutionality of a
statute establishing an independent agency has a number of features
that better accomplish the objective of identifying when Congress has
gone too far in structuring agencies with independence from the
President. First, unlike the core functions approach and the variants
discussed in Part II, it does not focus on executive power per se and is
therefore not unduly constrained by the facts of Morrison. If
executive power is analogized to clear water that fills "Beaker One"
to its brim, in other words, the core functions test would ask whether
the water in Beaker One has been partially drained by a statute to the
point where it can no longer serve its intended constitutional purpose.
So, too, consideration of whether the efficiency justification for a
unitary executive has been compromised would, by analogy, focus on
the absolute amount of water in Beaker One. But the question of
whether the water has been drained to an excessive point begs
another crucial one: what is the intended purpose and role of the
water in Beaker One in the first instance? Without an answer to this
provocative question, the core functions test and the related
efficiency justification approach falter.
The presidential accountability approach discussed in Part II is
also largely concerned with executive power per se. That is, if the
clear water represents the actual (versus normative) whole of
executive power, does that power include responsibility for the acts of
the inferior officer in question? With its "double for-cause" limitation
on the President's power to remove Board members, and its denial of
presidential power to appoint them, the answer is likely "no" under
270. Other scholars have endorsed similar lines of analysis. See Harold J. Krent, The
Lamentable Notion of Indefeasible PresidentialPowers: A Reply to Professor Prakash, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 1383, 1398 (2006) ("In assessing [a] congressional intrusion, courts
should thus not ask whether the intrusion is reasonable in light of the congressional
objective.... nor ask whether the intrusion leaves the Executive with sufficient power to
attain constitutional objectives, as in Morrison v. Olson. Rather, the Court should first ask
whether the clash threatens to undermine one of the critical checks and balances in the
Constitution itself.") (citations omitted); cf Sargentich, supra note 28, at 463 ("[T]he
matter is so muddled that we should abandon the task, and focus instead on an effort to
realize the values of checks and balances in the relations between agencies, on the one
hand, and Congress and the President, on the other hand."); Strauss, supra note 4, at 499
("Rather than argue that particular relationships (such as the removal power) are
necessary, the alternative inquiry I suggest would have focused upon the overall
framework of relationships, a framework whose elements may vary."); Treanor, supra
note 123, at 997 ("Judges in the Founding era were not textualists when they engaged in
constitutional interpretation ...[but] acted aggressively to protect the basic constitutional
boundaries that were not protected by the political process itself.").
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.27 ' Responsibility for the PCAOB's actions,
by design, does not evidently lie with the President. Although
appealing, the problem with the accountability approach is that it
collides with Morrison. The independent counsel law was enacted to
remove prosecution of executive branch officials from the purview of
presidential accountability and control. Technically, the Attorney
General had removal authority; but for all practical purposes, the
independent counsel was most certainly not accountable to the
President.2 72
The accountability approach does, however, become useful if
Beaker One is not viewed in isolation. If Beaker Two contains yellow
water representing Congress, and Beaker Three contains blue water
representing the courts, responsibility for the PCAOB resides in
neither. In effect, the Act requires the addition of another beaker to
the analogy: Beaker Four representing the SEC. The SEC has no
constitutionally assigned powers, so Beaker Four is empty. But it still
reflects the locus of responsibility for the PCAOB's actions.
Building on the concept of presidential accountability, a checksand-balances approach would assess the contents of Beaker One
relative to those of Beakers Two and Three. In other words, if the
President does not have the actual power in Beaker One to check the
Board's activities and hold it accountable for missteps, then either
Congress or the courts must. This approach does not concern itself in
the first instance with the question of what absolute powers should be
housed in each beaker or, if oversight responsibility for the PCAOB
is shared, in what proportion. It simply requires that mechanisms for
effective oversight of the PCAOB are lodged in one of the beakers
containing water. Otherwise, the Act may well fail the test.
The second distifnguishing feature of a checks-and-balances
approach is that it would enable the Supreme Court to meaningfully
scrutinize independent agency configurations without disavowing
prior appointment and removal decisions that operate to protect the
constitutionality of independent agencies per se. 273 As the D.C.
Circuit majority pointed out in much of Free Enterprise Fund, the
plaintiffs' Morrison-basedchallenge to the Act's constitutionality was

271. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4), (6) (2006).
272. See supra Part II.B.1.
273. See Miller, supra note 1, at 57-58 ("Other things being equal, it would be desirable
if the rule to be adopted were one that could be squared with the Court's decisions in the
area.").
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essentially foreclosed by Humphrey's Executor and its progeny.274
Under a checks-and-balances approach, the Court could find that the
traditional independent agency model includes sufficient checks on
agency behavior while tamping down on legislative attempts to
increase agency independence. The Court in Humphrey's Executor
explicitly emphasized, for example, that Congress intended the FTC
'
to "be independent of executive authority, except in its selection."275
Thus, the President's ability to appoint and remove independent
agency officials presents a critical distinction between the SEC and
the PCAOB under a checks-and-balances approach to the Act's
constitutionality.
Nor does Humphrey's Executor's tolerance of "for cause"
limitations on the President's removal power foreclose a finding that
sufficient checks and balances exist under the traditional independent
agency model. "For cause" limitations have persisted for decades, yet
Presidents have not complained of an impaired ability to manage
independent agencies. 2 6 Although a President cannot remove most
board members or commissioners for any reason, "cause" generally
encompasses those of greatest concern, such as inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or outright malfeasance. 7 Morrison does not hold to the
contrary. The Court at least implied that some level of control
through the President's chain of command is a constitutional
imperative.2 7 8 And, in fact, the independent counsel was subject to
legislative, judicial, and executive checks on the exercise of undue
power. She was removable for cause by the Attorney General (a
Cabinet-level principal officer), her tenure was terminable by the
special court responsible for her appointment, her activities were
subject to congressional oversight, and her prosecutorial decisions

274. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) ("The bulk of the Fund's challenge to the Act was fought-and lost-over
seventy years ago when the Supreme Court decided Humphrey's Executor."), reh'g en
banc denied, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
275. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935).
276. See Miller, supra note 1, at 84 ("If a practice of government has persisted for many
years without significant controversy, then this is evidence that the practice is
constitutional, or has become so by prescription.").
277. Geoffrey Miller has observed that "[miany statutes creating independent agencies
do not clearly set forth the kinds of actions that constitute 'cause' justifying removal by the
President," while others "set forth a detailed list of the actions that justify removal." Id. at
86-87 (citations omitted).
278. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 113 ("The notion of 'inferior' implies the
existence of a superior, and a truly independent counsel-that is, one not at all
controllable by the Attorney General or the President-would have no superior.").
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were susceptible to judicial review under conventional criminal law
principles.2 79
Third, a checks-and-balances analysis acknowledges the
complexities of the modern administrative state and thus affords
Congress flexibility in crafting new agency forms. The dissenting D.C.
Circuit judge in Free Enterprise Fund suggested a clear threshold for
the constitutionality of independent agencies that would require
Congress to lodge appointment and removal power with the
President or his alter ego, that is, someone whom the President can
fire at will.28° A "President or alter ego-only" standard for
appointment and removal of independent agency officials would
categorically reject the notion that, as a matter of separation of
powers, Congress may have good reason to protect a future entity
from such (albeit indirect) presidential oversight. This may be entirely
appropriate. Yet as commentators have observed, the administration
of President George W. Bush was characterized by an expansive view
of executive power that brought theory into practice and, in the view
of many, led to widespread abuses. 2 1 If permanently ensconced in
American politics and constitutional doctrine, the Bush theory of the
unitary executive could require a rebalancing of power within the
administrative state to foster objective and reasoned decision-making
on the part of agency officials. Because a President or alter ego-only
standard assumes that minor adjustments to the PCAOB model
would never be good policy, it should be embraced only upon careful
consideration of its cost: the luxury of legislative adaptation that gave
birth to the independent agency in the first place.
Finally, instead of looking to removal as the key mechanism for
ensuring agency accountability to the public, a checks-and-balances
approach considers a full menu of mechanisms for scrutinizing and
penalizing overreaching and incompetence on the part of
independent agency officials and asks whether those provided in
given legislation, taken together, operate to sufficiently cabin agency
behavior. A checks-and-balances model would thus enable Congress
to continue its quest for agency independence without the

279. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (citing pertinent provisions of the
independent counsel statute).
280. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), reh'g en banc denied, cert. granted,129 S. Ct.
2378 (2009).
281. Charlie Savage & Neil A. Lewis, Release of Memos Fuels Push for Inquiry into
Bush's Terror-FightingPolicies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at A18; see also supra note 193
and accompanying text (describing Bush's extreme unitary-executive position).
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unwavering "green light" to create novel independent agencies that
existing doctrine appears to afford it. Courts would look to whether
the branches of government are collectively positioned to
meaningfully "check" the excesses of the independent entity in
question. Such an approach keeps faith with the most fundamental
goals of the framers' original scheme-regardless of whether a
mechanical application of Appointments Clause precedent allows for
independent officials to operate beyond the President's meaningful
control.
B.

Structural Constraintsand the PCAOB

This section proceeds from the premise set forth in Part II-that
the Court's appointment and removal jurisprudence has drained
Article II of its heft in restraining congressional attempts to render
independent agencies even more independent. It then applies a
checks-and-balances approach to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act creating
the PCAOB, and suggests that the tools for PCAOB oversight that
exist under the statute are insufficient. Instead, SEC oversight
coupled with other traditional oversight mechanisms, such as judicial
review, would go a long way toward ensuring proper checks on
PCAOB activity.
1. Checks on Agencies
A
checks-and-balances
standard
for
reviewing
the
constitutionality of novel independent agency structures requires in
the first instance some coalescence around what mechanisms exist for
agency oversight. Collectively, such mechanisms enhance the
separation of powers by safeguarding an important structural interest
protected by the Appointments Clause: accountability.28 2 Under a
checks-and-balances approach to the constitutionality of independent
agencies, these structural interests may be satisfied by a variety or
combination of oversight tools grounded in the three-branch system.
The first of such tools is appointment by the President. William
Howard Taft once stated that "one of the functions which in a
practical way gives the President more personal influence than any
other is that of appointments., 283 Appointment is one way in which
the President implements the goals of his administration. Congress, in
282. A checks-and-balances approach would not necessarily operate to protect other
structural interests of the Appointments Clause, such as ensuring coordination and
uniformity within the executive branch.
283.

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND His POWERS 55 (1916).
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turn, has the power to either consent to or reject presidential
appointments, which "can be used as leverage over related and even
completely unrelated areas in which the Senate has an interest in the
execution of the laws."'
Second is the President's reciprocal removal power. By posing
the threat of removal, the President operates as a check on potential
malfeasance by those who he appointed. The threat of impeachment
by Congress, to a lesser extent, also serves this objective.285
Third is the power of the purse. Congress must appropriate to
agencies the money they need to operate. If members of the
democratically-elected Congress perceive dysfunction or wrongdoing
on the part of an agency, legislators can exert influence by
legislatively specifying how funding may or may not be spent.286
Moreover, the President prepares an annual budget.287 Most agencies
must have their budgets approved by OMB,288 which oversees and
coordinates the President's procurement, financial management,
information, and regulatory policies. The process enables the
President to enforce his program priorities by restraining agency
spending and monitoring performance. 289 Hence, control of the purse
strings plays a substantial role in administrative oversight, and it is
exercised by both Congress and the President.29 °
Congress has additional tools at its disposal to check agency
excesses. These include, fourth, the power to hold investigative
hearings to bring public scrutiny to agency activities. Congress has
conducted investigations of malfeasance since the 1790s.291 After the
House of Representatives empowered the Committee on
Manufacturers to "send for persons and papers" relating to tariff
legislation in 1827, both houses have considered it their right to
summon anyone, whether inside or outside the government, to

284. Jack M. Beermann, CongressionalAdministration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 111
(2006).
285. Jack Beermann explains that executive officials are rarely threatened with
impeachment "because they can usually be removed by the President or some other
supervisory federal official." Id. at 112.
286. Id. at 85-90 (explaining that Congress can influence federal agencies through
appropriation riders or by threatening to withhold funds).
287. Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
288. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 92.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Michael Edmund O'Neill, The Fifth Amendment in Congress: Revisiting the
Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2458-59 (2002).
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testify.292 Congress established the General Accountability Office to
conduct investigations and engage in general oversight of the
executive branch. 293 The very anticipation of public testimony may be
enough to prompt unelected officials to make adjustments to agency
priorities, policies, or programs.
Fifth, both Congress and the President supervise agencies
informally. This form of oversight "takes a variety of forms, including
cajoling, adverse publicity ... [and] informal contacts with agency
members and staff., 294 Congress, accordingly, may achieve desired
administrative outcomes by merely threatening to take legislative
action, thereby shortcutting the legislative process.295
Sixth, Congress can legislatively amend the statute that gives an
agency its powers to enhance statutory oversight mechanisms, to
constrict agency authority, 296 or to abolish the agency entirely.2 97 It
may also pass legislation approving particular agency action
notwithstanding pending litigation 29 s or setting forth burdensome
reporting or certification requirements. 99 Under the Congressional
Review Act ("CRA"), °° for example, agencies must submit proposed
rules to Congress along with a cost-benefit analysis, and Congress
may legislatively reject them within a specified time frame.'
Although Congress possesses this power without the CRA, the
statute gives it advance notice of proposed rules and an expedited
procedure for overriding them.30 2 Other statutes contain "sunset
292. Howard R. Sklamberg, Investigation Versus Prosecution:The ConstitutionalLimits
on Congress's Power to Immunize Witnesses, 78 N.C. L. REV. 153, 182-83 & n.191 (1999).
In 1857, Congress provided that reluctant witnesses could be held in contempt and tried by
the federal courts. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 207 n.45 (1957).
293. Beermann, supra note 284, at 128.

294. Id. at 70.
295. Id. at 68.
296. The Senate must also concur with the President's exercise of his power to make
treaties, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, and "may attach conditions to the ratification to force
interpretation or application of the treaty in a particular direction" or later "pass
legislation that is inconsistent with the treaty or that, in effect, prevents the President from
carrying out the treaty." Beermann, supra note 284, at 77.
297. See Beermann, supra note 284, at 108 ("Dissatisfaction with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's performance, for example, led Congress to abolish that agency
and reallocate its functions among agencies within the Department of Justice, where the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") was located, and the new Department of
Homeland Security.").
298. Id. at 68.
299. Id. at 106-07.
300. Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868 (1996) (codified as

amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2006)).
301.

5 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).

302. Beermann, supra note 284, at 83-84.
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provisions" which automatically extinguish legislation after a certain
period of time unless reauthorized by Congress, thereby incentivizing
agencies to construe and enforce legislation in a manner that
maximizes its chances of renewal by a satisfied Congress.3" 3
Seventh, the President has peremptory powers under the
Constitution. He can either sign or veto a bill that broadens or
restricts agency power or independence from the President.3" He also
has the power to issue pardons contravening criminal convictions
secured by prosecutors.3 5
Eighth, Congress has enacted numerous statutes of broad
applicability, such as the APA and its Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") provisions,"' which impose important procedural
limitations on agency activity. 3 7 The President plays a role in
enforcing such legislation, as well: OIRA, a division of OMB,
administers the Paperwork Reduction Act and thus oversees the
rulemaking process.3 8 Presidents on their own initiative have issued
executive orders providing for additional procedural safeguards on
agency decision making, although these generally do not extend to
independent agencies.30 9
The importance of the final two mechanisms by which agency
activity is checked cannot be overstated. The ninth of these is judicial
review. The APA contains a catch-all provision enabling affected
parties to challenge both action and inaction by any "agency," as that

303. Id. at 106.
304. See U.S. CONST.art. I, § 7 (enabling the President to enact or reject legislation
generally).
305. Id. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves and pardons
for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
306. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
307. See Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 100-01 (2003) (describing core Administrative
Procedure Act requirements); David C. Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the
Current Legal Landscape of FederalRight-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1795-99
(2008) (describing history and basic provisions of the Freedom of Information Act).
308. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 93.
309. See Stack, supra note 148, at 410 & n.41 (observing that the Reagan White
House's decision not to extend the executive order requiring centralized review to
independent agencies was driven by politics and the desire to avoid a turf battle with
Congress). Executive Order 12,866 is the latest in a succession of presidential efforts to
control agency policy making by requiring that "agency rules undergo cost-benefit analysis
supervised by OMB officials." PIERCE ET AL., supra note 5, at 97.
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term is defined in the statute.31 0 Numerous other statutes specific to
particular agencies contain their own provisions for judicial review.311
Tenth, and finally, the media serves an invaluable role in the
checks-and-balances equation by bringing public attention to abuses
and malfeasance by government officials. Its ability to do this
effectively, however, is contingent upon its access to information.
Although informal, off-the-record communications are central to this
process, the press's ability to fulfill its societal role in ensuring
government accountability would be compromised without the
numerous disclosure statutes that constrain the ability of government
officials to act in secret. These include most prominently the FOIA,31 2
the Government in the Sunshine Act,3 13 the Presidential Records
Act, 314 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act.315
2. Checks on the PCAOB
As for the PCAOB, too many of the traditional tools for
ensuring adequate checks and balances appear to be missing.
The President neither appoints nor removes Board members.
Although President Bush could have vetoed the Act and preserved
the measure of presidential removal authority that exists under the
traditional agency model, he did not.316
The legislature established the Board to "have succession until
dissolved by an Act of Congress."31' 7 Congress has broad authority to
alter its structure, powers, and responsibilities; to call members before
an oversight hearing; to strengthen the statutory mechanisms for
oversight of the Board; or to dissolve it entirely.31 8 Political scientists
debate whether active congressional hearings provide Congress with a
310. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
311. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 609 (2006) (providing judicial review of contract disputes
between agencies and contractors). Congress has also statutorily granted itself the right to
intervene in litigation. Beermann, supra note 284, at 112-13 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a)
(2000)).
312. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
313. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006)).
314. Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as
amended at U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2006)).
315. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)).
316. Vetoes, of course, are politically costly and cause gridlock. In any event, the fact
that a sitting President chooses not to veto legislation does not render that legislation
constitutional.
317. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
318. See supra Part I.B.
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durable check on the actions of agencies3 19 or whether "the only

mechanisms that prevent [agencies] from ignoring Congress's goals
altogether are judicial review and the possibility of further
32 As Jack Beermann has observed, the "sheer number of
legislation.""
administrative actions and level of technical detail often involved

make it impossible for Congress to monitor the vast majority of
administrative actions."32 ' Congress's ability to influence an agency by
controlling its budget may be of greater utility.322 Yet Congress
foreswore it in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,323 under which the Board sets
its own budget and salaries and funds itself by collecting fees-or a
"tax"-on publicly traded companies pursuant to rules promulgated
by the PCAOB.324

The Act defines the PCAOB in such a way as to exempt it from
the APA's coverage, providing that "[t]he Board shall not be an
325
agency or establishment of the United States Government.
Documents prepared or received by the Board in connection with
inspections, investigations, or Board deliberations are exempt from
disclosure to the public under the FOIA.326 Without FOIA access to

319. Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair "The Broken Branch"?, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 765, 783 (2009).
320. Beermann, supra note 284, at 65 (citation omitted).
321. Id. at 99.
322. See id. at 68, 84.
323. This is not entirely unusual, however, as "most independent agencies enjoy a
measure of discretionary authority over matters such as budget, relations with Congress,
and positions taken in litigation." Miller, supra note 1, at 51.
324. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(f)(5) (2006). See Carvin et al., supra note 20, at 207. From its
funds, Board members and their staff are paid exponentially higher salaries than their
SEC counterparts-615,000 for the Board's Chairman in 2007 alone. Nicholas Rummell,
The SarBOX: Accounting Czar Is a $600,000 Man, FINANCIAL WEEK, Aug. 20, 2007,
http://www.financialweek.com/article/20070820/REG/70817024/1002/TOC.
This salary
substantially exceeds those of former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, who made
$154,600 that year, Lynn Hume, Regulator Salary Gap Widens, BOND BUYER (New
York), Aug. 16, 2007, at 1, and President Bush himself, who was paid approximately
$400,000, see Bush Paid $221,635 in Taxes for 2007, USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2008-04-11-bush-taxesN.htm. The pay of
PCAOB staff members similarly dwarfs those of career government employees paid on
the general schedule--or GS-scale. See Rummell, supra.
325. § 7211(b). The APA defines "agency" as "each authority of the Government of
the United States," with certain exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006).
326. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(5)(A) (2006) ("[A]II documents and information prepared or
received by or specifically for the Board, and deliberations of the Board and its employees
and agents, in connection with an inspection. . . or with an investigation under this section
... shall be exempt from disclosure, in the hands of an agency or establishment of the
Federal Government, under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)), or
otherwise, unless and until presented in connection with a public proceeding or
released....").
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the PCAOB's records, the ability to bring public scrutiny to Board

malfeasance is hampered.
The Act is largely silent with respect to whether the PCAOB's
exercised powers-as well as the SEC's review of the same-may be

challenged in court. The Act generically contemplates that the
PCAOB will defend itself in state and federal court, and authorizes
the Board to do so with SEC approval."' But it includes no provision
for judicial review of the Board's actions. This is noteworthy. As
Peter Strauss has observed, "Congress generally provides rather full
review of administrative action," and enhanced agency independence
"suggests a need for greater judicial control than would be
experienced for an agency more firmly attached to the President."32' 8

Even where available, the scope of judicial review is more
circumscribed than that which applies to the actions of the SEC
itself.329 Judicial review of the Board's inspection activity is expressly
foreclosed.3 3 ° Judicial review of the Board's final rules is only

available under the Securities and Exchange Act ("SEC Act") if
those rules were approved by the SEC."' It is unavailable, however, if
a party seeks to challenge the PCAOB's failure or refusal to address a

327. § 7211(f) ("[The Board] shall have the power.., to sue and be sued, complain and
defend, in its corporate name and through its own counsel, with the approval of the
Commission, in any Federal, State, or other court.").
328. Strauss, supra note 4, at 524-25.
329. For PCAOB investigations that culminate in sanctions, the Act says nothing about
review by a federal court, although the judicial review provision of the Securities
Exchange Act ("SEC Act") does apply to final SEC orders resolving appeals from the
Board's disciplinary determinations. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2006) ("A person aggrieved by
a final order of the Commission ...may obtain review of the order in [an appropriate
federal Court of Appeals].").
330. 15 U.S.C. § 7214(h)(2) (2006) ("Any decision of the Commission with respect to a
review [of an inspection report] shall not be reviewable under... [the Securities Exchange
Act]. . . or deemed to be 'final agency action' for purposes of [APA review].").
331. § 78y(b)(1) ("A person adversely affected by a rule of the Commission ...may
obtain review of this rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he
resides or has his principal place of business or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by
filing in such court, within sixty days after the promulgation of the rule, a written petition
requesting that the rule be set aside."). Section 78y(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act
further provides for judicial review of SEC decisions:
A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission entered pursuant to this
chapter may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for
the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of business, or for the
District of Columbia Circuit, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the
entry of the order, a written petition requesting that the order be modified or set
aside in whole or in part.
§ 78y(a)(1).
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regulatory need-including the promulgation of a new rule or the
amendment or repeal of an existing one.332
3. Another Look at the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

The primary check on Board activity resides neither in the
legislative, executive, or judicial branches, but in another independent
agency which exercises legislative, executive, and judicial power: the
SEC. Despite the widespread integration of independent agencies
into the national system of government, the very notion of an agency
that lies neither amongst the legislators nor the judges nor the
President's Cabinet remains difficult to square with a tripartite
governmental structure.333 With the PCAOB, moreover, its nonagency within an independent agency stature renders it directly
beholden only to a form of agency that is itself not directly beholden
to the President. It is as if the Constitution created Beakers One to
Three in our analogy but Congress unilaterally decided that the
Constitution was incomplete. It therefore produced Beaker Four to
ensure proper auditing of public companies subject to federal
securities laws-despite the lack of constitutional "water" to fill it.
Even if the creation of Beaker Four was justified as a matter of
policy, it was not created to encompass the full power of the PCAOB.
To be sure, in addition to affording it appointment and removal
power, the Act broadly provides that the SEC "shall have oversight
'
and enforcement authority over the Board,"334
including the power to

modify or abrogate PCAOB rules,335 relieve the Board of its
332. Accordingly, the APA's requirement that agencies give interested persons a right
to petition for a new or amended rule, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006), as well as "[p]rompt notice
...of the denial" of such a petition, id., and rights to judicial review, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701,
702, 706 (2006), do not constrain the PCAOB.
333. See Carvin et al., supra note 20, at 201.
334. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(a) (2006).
335. § 7217(b)(2)-(3) ("No rule of the Board shall become effective without prior
approval of the Commission, [which] ...shall approve a proposed rule, if it finds that the
rule is consistent with the requirements of this Act and the securities laws, or is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 7231 (2006) (amending the SEC Act to enable the Board to grant exemptions from
various prohibitions on registered firms' ability to perform non-audit services
contemporaneously with the audit of public companies, and subjecting the Board's
exemption determinations to SEC review in the same manner as § 7217 provides for
rules). Thus, the SEC must approve all PCAOB rules before they go into effect, a process
which includes a second public notice and comment period as required by the SEC Act.
See § 7217 (b)(4) ("The provisions of... [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(b) (2006))] shall govern the proposed rules of the Board, as fully as if the Board
were a 'registered securities association' for purposes of that section 78s(b)."). The SEC
can abrogate PCAOB rules, as well. See § 7217(b)(5) ("The provisions of section 78s(c) of
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enforcement responsibilities entirely,3 36 and censure it for
impropriety.3 37 If the PCAOB decides to impose sanctions following
an investigation, it must report them to the SEC,338 which can affirm,
modify, remand, set aside, or enhance the Board's sanction.33 9
The SEC only narrowly reviews the PCAOB's ongoing
inspection program, however. Parties can seek SEC review of the
Board's "draft inspection reports, 3 40 but there is no statutory
provision enabling appeals of final inspection reports or authorizing
SEC review of the conduct of the Board's inspections. Similarly,
nothing in the Act enables parties to appeal the Board's decisions to
initiate investigations.3 41 Yet the Board has the power to subpoena
testimony or production of documents and revoke a firm's
registration for refusals "to testify, produce documents, or otherwise
3 42
cooperate with the Board in connection with an investigation.
The Act's shortcomings under a checks-and-balances approach,
therefore, are twofold. First, it leaves certain activities of the PCAOB
completely beyond review.3 43 The structure of the Constitution
presupposes the existence of both political and judicial checks on the

[the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78s(c))] shall govern the abrogation,
deletion, or addition to portions of the rules of the Board by the Commission as fully as if
the Board were a 'registered securities association' for purposes of that section 78c ...
336. § 7217(d)(1).
337. § 7217(d)(2). In particular, the SEC can impose limitations on the Board's
activities if it finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that the Board "has violated
or is unable to comply with any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board, or the
securities laws" or "without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce
compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by a registered
public accounting firm or an associated person thereof." § 7217(d)(2)(A)-(B). The Act
also specifies that the Board shall be treated as a "registered securities association" for
purposes of SEC Act provisions which mandate recordkeeping by covered entities and
allow SEC examinations of securities-related records and reports. § 7217(a) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006)).
338. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(d)(1)(A), 7217(c)(1) (2006). For purposes of the SEC's review,
the Board is considered a "self-regulatory organization" governed by the SEC Act, which
affords aggrieved parties basic guarantees of due process. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(d)(2), (e)(1).
339. §§ 78s(e)(1), 7217(c)(3).
340. 15 U.S.C. § 7214(h)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) ("A registered public accounting firm may
seek review by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, pursuant to such rules as the
Commission shall promulgate.").
341. § 7215(a)-(b)(1).
342. § 7215(b)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(3)(A). Although the Board may request documents and
testimony from persons other than registered firms and their associates, it must go to the
SEC for a subpoena if such parties are non-compliant. See § 7215(b)(2)(C)-(D).
343. Peter Strauss notes that quasi-public institutions such as the NASD similarly
control the initiation of disciplinary actions. Strauss, supra note 16, at 53.
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exercise of power.'" The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides neither. Even

if the proper role of the President vis-A-vis agencies is merely "one of
oversight rather than substitution of judgment, 3 45 the statute leaves
the PCAOB beyond his reach. It embodies a movement of the
national bureaucracy "beyond effective control, either by the people

or by those whom the people directly select to head the government
for them."3'46 Senator Gramm touched upon the problem with
allowing the PCAOB to have such "massive power, unchecked
power, by design"3 47 :

Its members are not elected officials. They are not appointed in
the sense that they are not Government officials. They will have
the ability to make decisions that will affect the livelihood of

Americans who are in the accounting profession. They will
literally have the ability to say to a CPA: We are taking your

license away and you can never practice again in providing
accounting services to a publicly traded company.... I think
when you are taking people's livelihoods; they ought to have an

opportunity to appeal to the Federal district court where they
live. I think there ought to be a burden on them to make their
case, and obviously the court is going to take into account that
this board, that was duly constituted, made a decision. But I

think that is an opportunity that people ought to have that they
do not have under this bill.348

344. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687,
1691 (2004).
345. Strauss, supra note 4, at 496.
346. Id. at 490 (discussing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), and N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982)).
347. 148 CONG. REC. 12,119 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
348. Id. at 14,442 (statement of Sen. Gramm). The legislative history of the Act reveals
little discussion regarding the amenability of the PCAOB to judicial review and no
discussion of the propriety of exempting the Board from the APA. Senator Phil Gramm
(R-Texas) was the only member of Congress to comment on the issue of judicial review of
the Board's decisions or, for that matter, on the overall powers of the Board. Senator
Gramm notably remarked that the Board was to have "massive power, unchecked power,
by design" that will enable it to "make decisions that affect all accountants and everybody
they work for, which directly or indirectly is every breathing person in the country." Id. at
12,119 (statement of Sen. Gramm). Despite their sound-byte appeal, these comments were
aimed not at the desirability of the Board having such power, but at the question of who
should be on a Board with such "tremendous, unbridled, unchecked power." He
explained:
We need to give some more thought to who is going to be on this board and is it
going to be something that is attractive enough to make people want to serve.... I
urge my colleagues, think long and hard when you think about this board exerting
tremendous, unbridled, unchecked power, about how many people you want on
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Short of Congress enabling judicial review, the issue Senator
Gramm raises might be addressed by requiring the SEC to sign off on
the PCAOB's investigative decisions. Such latter revisions to the Act,
however, would leave in place a second problem. The notion that a
fourth branch of government-here, the SEC-provides the needed
checks and balances is inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers. The Constitution establishes three branches of government.
The SEC is not democratically elected,3 49 and Congress is
constitutionally barred from removing Commissioners. 3 0 Nor does
the SEC fall within the judicial power of Article III. To the extent it is
constitutionally viable, it is likely so because the President appoints
and removes Commissioners for cause.35 ' In that way, it is arm of the
executive branch. 352 But the entire justification for finding the Act
constitutional rests on SEC oversight-and distinctly not on
presidential oversight.
The Act does leave intact the President's ability to appoint SEC
members and remove them for cause, the SEC's susceptibility to
judicial review, and Congress's ability to exert influence over the SEC
through its appropriations, investigatory, and legislative powers. This
Article does not attempt to address as an empirical matter whether
such constraints on SEC power operate to effectively constrain
PCAOB power as well. It suggests, rather, that crowning the SEC as a
pseudo-government "branch" that is responsible for checking
PCAOB power is somewhat extraordinary under basic separationsof-powers principles. If Congress is going to limit presidential
appointment and removal power, it should consider retaining levers
of oversight that originate in Articles I or III of the Constitutionjudicial review, statutory requirements for public disclosure, and
financial control.
the board who know something about the subject matter. Today, in an
environment where accountants are the evil people of the world, the enemies of
the people, having no accountants on this board or relatively few and not letting
them vote when ethics matters are being dealt with, I assert that kind of approach
means you are not going to have first-rate people who are going to want to serve.
Id.
349. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
350. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1986) (holding that Congress may not
retain the power to remove an officer exercising executive powers).
351. See Miller, supra note 1, at 65 (concluding that since the Constitution specifies that
there are three branches of government, independent agencies must be considered as part
of the executive branch); see also Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252, 252-56 (disputing independence of independent
agencies because chairmen are re-designated on an annual basis by the President).
352. Miller, supra note 1, at 65.
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One problem with a checks-and-balances approach to
constraining the creation of novel independent agencies is that it
attempts to elevate mechanisms of accountability that are entirely
discretionary on Congress's part-such as judicial review and the
appropriations power-and render them constitutionally mandatory.
In that sense, it would be preferable to use the Appointments Clause
because the Constitution binds Congress. This Article does not mean
to suggest that a checks-and-balances approach is superior to one
grounded in the Appointments Clause. The point is that the facts of
Morrison largely foreclose such an analysis. As a result, the
Appointments Clause is not a vibrant tool for cabining congressional
overreaching in fashioning independence for agencies. And the Court
is unlikely to touch its longstanding precedent under it.
What is missing from prevailing doctrine governing the
constitutionality of the Act, therefore, is an accounting of the myriad
mechanisms for ensuring that policymaking, law-enforcing bodies are
accountable to the public via the elected branches and to the rule of
law via the courts. Judicial review would enable the PCAOB to be
checked by the power set forth in Article III. Ongoing appropriations
authority would put the PCAOB within the legislative power of
Article I. Susceptibility to disclosure statutes would enable public
access to the inner workings of the PCAOB which, in turn, can
prompt congressional calls for investigation. All of these mechanisms
for ensuring accountability are missing from the Act. The statutory
dearth of these details falls under the radar. And there is no evident
basis in existing case law for ensuring that a statute that lacks such
mechanisms conforms to separation of powers norms.
To be sure, the checks-and-balances approach proposed here is
both incomplete and susceptible to the same line-drawing critique this
Article lodges against the "core function" test.353 How to determine
whether a statute contains sufficient mechanisms for accountability
under the list compiled above is a question that warrants further
research and analysis. The aim of this Article is not to propose and
defend a self-contained answer to the conundrum of independent
agencies. It is, rather, to begin a dialogue for responding to this
problem within the Court's existing doctrine. As Peter McCutchen
has suggested, given the entrenchment of independent agencies in our
353. See Sargentich, supra note 28, at 459 (noting that the idea of checks and balances

"does not answer all questions, for many involve doubts about the very nature of such a
boundary" between the branches). Indeed, a key question in implementing a checks-andbalances approach is "how much is too much, and by what measures are such things to be
determined?" Id. at 440-41.
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modern government, "a form of constitutional damage control" is
what is called for at this point.3 14 Checks-and-balances scrutiny could,
accordingly, "move governmental structures closer to the
constitutional equilibrium" that has been disrupted by deficient
precedent.
CONCLUSION

The current economic crisis has shined a spotlight on the status
of the modern administrative state. Skirmishes continue over the
propriety of re-regulation after the catastrophic failures of deregulation.356 Finger-pointing abounds, as politicians and the public
strive to identify responsible government and private actors. How
best to regulate the regulators lies among these pressing issues. In this
regard, this Article addresses whether there exists a meaningful
constitutional standard for reviewing the propriety of increased
independence for independent agencies.
The independent agency, though oft-critiqued as beyond the
purview of the three-branch system established by the framers in the
Constitution, has become a cornerstone of American government. In
a series of opinions over the last century, the Supreme Court has
tailored constitutional doctrine under the Appointments Clause to
uphold these institutions. 7 The most recent case-Morrison v.
Olson-stands undisturbed for nearly two decades. Congress's
creation of the PCAOB after the collapse of Enron has reignited the
debate over the constitutionality of novel agency forms. This is
because, in establishing the Board, Congress eschewed the traditional
independent agency model and fashioned the PCAOB to have
"massive power, unchecked power, by design."3 8 The most glaring
aspect of this design is that the SEC-and not the President-has the
power to appoint and remove Board members and to oversee its
operations.35 9
354. Peter McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a ConstitutionalTheory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
355. Id.

356. Compare Richard D. Cudahy, The Coming Demise of Deregulation 11, 61 ADMIN.
L. REV. 543,556 (2009) ("[T]he demise of deregulation is now virtually guaranteed."), with
Luca Enriques, Regulators' Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming Reregulation
of FinancialMarkets: One Reluctant Regulator's View, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1147, 1155

(2009) ("[E]xcessive reregulation today is the best guarantee of effective pressure towards
deregulation tomorrow.").
357. See supra Part II.
358. 148 CONG. REC. 12,119 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
359. See supra Part I.B.
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In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight

Board, this new blueprint for the independent agency was challenged
unsuccessfully in the D.C. Circuit, prompting the dissenting judge to
charge the majority with giving Congress a "green light for all sorts of
new creations, independent agencies within independent agencies.""
Under prevailing law, Congress controls the extent to which the
President has appointment and removal authority so long as it
identifies within the administrative apparatus a person or entityother than the President-that has some supervisory, directory, or
removal power over Board members. This formula for creating an
"inferior officer" within the meaning of Article II fails to address the
broader problem of a policymaking, law-enforcing entity that is
effectively independent of any of the three branches of government.
This is partly because the Court has bootstrapped its narrow
"inferiority" analysis into the more expansive conclusion that
limitations on the President's power to appoint and remove such
officers does not interfere with core executive functions. In doing so,
it has neglected to engage the threshold questions of the scope of
executive power and what it means to unconstitutionally interfere
with it.
This Article suggests that the Court instead employ a segment of
separation-of-powers theory-the need to ensure proper checks and
balances amongst the three branches of government-in evaluating
statutes such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While the Act leaves the
PCAOB substantially unrestrained by the President, the legislature,
and the courts, the unelected, "independent" SEC is a dubious
substitute for the coordinate branches established in the Constitution.
This Article posits as a general approach that if Congress aims to
insulate independent agencies from the President's direct power to
appoint and remove officials in future legislation, it should retain
traditional oversight mechanisms that are grounded in Articles I and
III of the Constitution, such as judicial review, budget control, and
susceptibility to government-in-the-sunshine laws.

360. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 35.

